Lost in Translation: Law, Economics, and Subjective Standards of Care in Negligence Law by Korsmo, Charles R.
Volume 118 
Issue 2 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 118, 
2013-2014 
10-1-2013 
Lost in Translation: Law, Economics, and Subjective Standards of 
Care in Negligence Law 
Charles R. Korsmo 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra 
Recommended Citation 
Charles R. Korsmo, Lost in Translation: Law, Economics, and Subjective Standards of Care in Negligence 
Law, 118 DICK. L. REV. 285 (2013). 
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol118/iss2/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more 
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu. 
Lost in Translation: Law, Economics, and




The law and economics movement has been a victim of its own
success. Over the past four decades, it has generated an enormous
specialist literature, often explicitly intended for other specialists. As is
so often the case with increased specialization, the result has been
escalating technical complexity accompanied by forbiddingly formal
mathematics and a tendency to retreat into abstraction. As a result,
economic analysis has often failed to provide general legal audiences
with insight into important legal questions, even where the tools of
economics would be appropriate and useful. This Article examines-and
rectifies-just such a failure. In particular, this Article examines
departures from a uniform reasonable person standard in negligence law.
From an economic standpoint, individuals might be held to different
standards of care because: (1) they differ in their costs of taking
precautions (e.g., a good driver can take additional precautions more
cheaply than a bad driver); or (2) they differ in the accident costs they
generate when exercising a given amount of care (e.g., a good driver
causes fewer accidents than a bad driver who is exercising the same
precautions). Though the two possibilities lead to sharply different
prescriptions, the law and economics literature has focused almost
entirely on the former scenario, while neglecting the latter. By
examining both possibilities, I provide a new and superior explanation of
how tort law treats disabilities and professional skill, with the potential to
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change the way these important topics are conceptualized, taught, and
ultimately adjudicated. In doing so, I also demonstrate the extent to
which important legal insights can remain unappreciated when buried in
an overly abstract mathematical literature.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The law and economics movement can lay a plausible claim to
being the most influential development in legal scholarship over the past
half-century. Tort law is, in some sense, the birthplace of that
movement. From Ronald Coase's discussion of social costs to Calabresi
and Melamed's exploration of liability rules to Posner's proposed
"Theory of Negligence," many of the movement's seminal works are
rooted in tort law. In the ensuing years, a voluminous literature has
grown up around such important questions as the relative efficiency of
negligence vs. strict liability, contributory negligence vs. comparative
fault, settlement and class action dynamics, products liability doctrine,
insurance, and professional malpractice.
As is so frequently the case, this literature has become increasingly
specialized and technical over time. Articles nominally about "tort law"
are often forbiddingly formal, involving mathematics far beyond the
understanding of most lawyers, judges, and traditional legal academics.
[Vol. 118:2
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The inevitable result of this specialization is that this scholarship has less
practical impact than it might if it were more readily accessible.
Even more problematic, many contemporary law and economics
articles are pitched at such a high level of abstraction that the
implications for actual legal practice are hazy at best, perhaps even to the
authors themselves. The situation calls to mind C.P. Snow's famous
lament about "The Two Cultures." On the one side are practitioners and
traditional scholars whose lack of mathematical sophistication forces
them to consume the insights of law and economics at second hand, if at
all. On the other are economists possessed of powerful analytic tools,
but sometimes insufficiently familiar-or concerned-with the actual
problems of tort law practice. All too often, the result is mutual
incomprehension and unnecessary confusion, with important economic
insights lost in translation.
This Article is principally concerned with one of these unnecessary
confusions-in particular, the confusion surrounding departures from the
"reasonable person" standard in negligence law. The immediate
questions involved are important in and of themselves. More generally,
however, this topic is emblematic of a growing mutual incomprehension.
The subject treated here is one where even relatively simple economic
reasoning can shed light, yet the matter has remained stubbornly murky.
It is my hope that the discussion below will help to dispel the fog, and do
so in a fashion that will be illuminating for economists and lawyers alike.
More broadly, it is my hope that the discussion will serve as a reminder
to non-economists of the insights economic reasoning can provide, and a
reminder to economists of the care that must be taken not to abstract
away vital practical questions.
First, consider the problem. One of the best-known rules in tort law
is that, subject to several important exceptions, the "reasonable person"
standard of care is an objective, uniform standard.1 That is, the law
expects people to behave as an ordinary, reasonable person would
behave under the circumstances, and they will not be held liable for any
injuries they cause so long as they do so. 2 Tort law does not typically
1. Joseph H. King, Jr., Reconciling the Exercise of Judgment and the Objective
Standard of Care in Medical Malpractice, 52 OKLA. L. REv. 49, 49 (1999). As King put
it:
There are two core principles in the law of negligence. The first is that
negligence law is a fault-based theory of liability (rather than strict liability),
and therefore requires proof that the defendant's conduct was substandard. The
second is that a person's conduct should be evaluated according to objective
criteria, rather than by a subjective assessment.
Id.
2. See, e.g., Vaughan v. Menlove, (1837) 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.P.); 3 Bing. 468
(N.C.); RESTATEMENT (TIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
2013]
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have one standard for the clumsy and another for the coordinated, one
standard for the wise and another for the foolish.3 A variety of
explanations, both economic and otherwise, have been offered for this
basic rule.
4
The general rule is subject to several important exceptions. While
negligence law holds most actors to an ordinary "reasonable person"
standard, it applies different standards to children, the physically
disabled, and certain professionals-most notably medical doctors-
acting in their professional capacity. More broadly, regulatory licensing
schemes frequently impose different obligations on individuals with
varying skill or expertise.
This much is standard black letter law. Despite being such
fundamental concepts, however, the reasonable person standard and the
exceptions to it are plagued by a surprising amount of confusion.
Judicial and scholarly attempts to explain and describe the nature of
these departures from a uniform standard of care are often hopelessly
confused and deeply unhelpful.
Courts and scholars have routinely described the physically disabled
as being held to a "lesser,",5 "lower,",6 or "less onerous" 7 standard. In
part, as discussed below, such statements merely echo the standard claim
of law and economics scholars, that "[b]lindness, lameness, or infirmity,
for instance, may lower the standard of care to which an individual
would otherwise be held; strength, size, special knowledge, or
professional skill may raise it."'8 This is certainly true in some sense, but
as many commentators have pointed out-including the authors of a
large number of influential torts casebooks-these broad claims are often
misleading. 9  The disabled are often required to take burdensome
precautions that the able-bodied are not. 1O
HARM § 3 cmt. a (2005) ("[T]he 'reasonable care' standard for negligence is basically the
same as a standard expressed in terms of the 'reasonably careful person' (or the
'reasonably prudent person')."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 284 (1965); OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 107-09 (1909).
3. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND
EMOTIONAL HARM § 11 cmt. a (2005) ("[A] person's claim of being born clumsy would
not be regarded as relevant [to a negligence inquiry].").
4. See infra pp. 299-304.
5. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 277 (2000).
6. See Holmes v. City of Oakland, 67 Cal. Rptr. 198, 202 (Ct. App. 1968).
7. See Caroline Forell, Essentialism, Empathy, and the Reasonable Woman, 1994
U. ILL. L. REv. 769, 779.
8. STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 75 (1987). As
detailed below, Shavell suggests reasons why courts might hold disabled persons to a
"higher" standard, though these arguments all proceed from the initial conclusion that,
but for special considerations, they would optimally be held to a "lower" standard.
9. See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., TORTS AND COMPENSATION: PERSONAL
ACCOUNTABILITY AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY 115 (6th ed. 2009)
[Vol. 118:2
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Nor is it clear, as it is often stated," that professionals are generally
held to a "higher" standard of care. On occasion, cases involve the
defendant arguing for application of a professional standard, on the
assumption that the professional standard will actually be more lenient
than a jury tasked with deciding what constitutes reasonable care.' 2
While some scholars have noted that the standard for professionals
cannot always accurately be described as "higher," they have been
unsuccessful in specifying how exactly the standard should be
described.
13
(questioning whether the exception for the physically disabled is always "an advantage"
or whether it actually "cut[s] both ways"); AARON D. TWERSKI & JAMES A. HENDERSON,
JR., TORTS 143 (2d ed. 2008) (suggesting somewhat cryptically that a physically disabled
person "may have to be more careful to his disability," even if"he is not held to a higher
standard of care."); Dominick VETRI ET AL., TORT LAW AND PRACTICE 89 (4th ed. 2011)
("The 'reasonable person with a physical disability' standard may require that a
physically disabled person exercise greater care than would be required for physically
able people in some situations."); see also 65A C.J.S. Negligence § 142 (2002) ("[lt may
be incumbent on one with a physical disability to put forth a greater degree of effort than
would otherwise be necessary in order to attain that standard of care which is required of
everyone.").
10. See Traphagan v. Mid-Am. Traffic Marking, 555 N.W.2d 778, 787 (Neb. 1996)
(noting that a sight-impaired driver was required to wear special glasses and add mirrors
to her car); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 11 cmt. b (2010) (suggesting that "a blind [person] may be found negligent for
walking over [unfamiliar] terrain without a cane or some other form of assistance");
DOBBS, supra note 5, at 282-83 (explaining that the "physical disability rule is not
always protective of disabled persons"); Anita Bernstein, The Communities That Make
Standards of Care Possible, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 735, 747-48 (2002); Daniel L.
Rubinfeld, The Efficiency of Comparative Negligence, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 375, 377
(1987) (noting that "individuals with slower reflexes or concentration may be forced to
drive more slowly than individuals with quicker reflexes, thus adding to their travel
time").
11. See, e.g., Aves v. Shah, 997 F.2d 762, 765 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that a doctor
who held herself out as a specialist could not object to jury instructions that held her to a
higher standard of care); Johnson v. Westfield Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 710 N.Y.S.2d 862, 863
(Sup. Ct. 2000) (holding doctors to a "higher" standard of care); Rehabilitative Care Sys.
of Am. v. Davis, 43 S.W.3d 649, 657 (Tex. App. 2001) (stating that "[t]he standard of
care required for medical care givers is higher than the standard of care required of
ordinary laypersons[,]" at least in part because "physicians and other medical care givers
possess greater skill and knowledge than laypersons"); 1 RONALD E. MALLEY & JEFFREY
M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 15.4 (1989) ("No court has rejected the concept that a
more demanding standard of care should be applied to specialists.").
12. See, e.g., Myers v. Heritage Enters., Inc., 820 N.E.2d 604, 608-09 (111. App. Ct.
2004); see also DOBBS, supra note 5, at 633-34.
13. RESTATEMENT (TiRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 12 cmt. a (2005). The Third Restatement's unhelpful description is typical of
the more "sophisticated" approach to professional skill:
[E]ven though the actor's extra skills can properly be considered, these skills
do not establish for the actor a standard of care that is higher than reasonable
care; rather, they provide a mere circumstance for the jury to consider in
2013]
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In his influential treatise, the venerable William L. Prosser noted
that "[i]t is sometimes said that a blind man must use a greater degree of
care than one who can see; but it is now generally agreed that as a fixed
rule this is inaccurate, and that the correct statement is merely that he
must take the precautions, be they more or less, which the ordinary
reasonable man would take if he were blind.' 4 The Restatement has
largely followed Prosser in this regard, with the same cagey approach
toward the standard for special skill or disability. ' 5 While this retreat to
"reasonableness" avoids saying anything flat-out inaccurate, it does so by
dodging the question. Neither Prosser nor the Restatement offers any
guidance in determining when more care should be required, and when
less should be condoned. A more recent commentator, summarizing the
unsatisfying state of understanding, suggests that "[n]ot higher, not
lower, just different is the message from scholars."' 6
Different, but different how? When should a person be held to a
higher standard, and when to a lower standard? What does it even mean
to hold someone to a "lower" or to a "higher" standard? Does it mean
the law allows the disabled to create more risk of harm than other
people? That it allows the disabled to take fewer precautions? Should
the law do such a thing? If the law holds professionals to a "higher
standard," does that mean they are required to achieve a greater degree of
safety than other people, or to take more care? Are these synonymous?
Might the same individual be required to take more of some precautions
and less of others? Why, and when? In general, how should the law
decide whether an individual should be held to a higher or a lower
standard of care, and how would courts actually go about doing it?' 7
These are hardly unimportant questions of mere academic interest.
They go to the very core of how courts and regulators proceed-or
should proceed-in countless disputes. Furthermore, as I will show
below, these questions lend themselves to relatively straightforward
determining whether the actor has complied with the general standard of
reasonable care.
Id.
14. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 151-52 (4th ed. 1971).
15. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 11 (a) (2010) ("The conduct of an actor with a physical disability is negligent
only if it does not conform to that of a reasonably careful person with the same
disability."); id. § 12 cmt. a (noting that "even though the actor's extra skills can properly
be considered," such skills do not establish a "higher" standard of care, but rather provide
a "mere circumstance" for the jury to consider; the possibility they might establish a
lower standard of care is ignored).
16. Bernstein, supra note 10, at 749.
17. Id. at 740 ("[T]he choices between objective and subjective approaches to the
standard of care reveal no particular logic. Nor has scholarly commentary shed much
light on the problem.").
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economic analyses, and rather clear answers. That such widespread
confusion reigns decades after these questions should have been resolved
is a testament to the massive amount of information that is simply lost in
translation between economists and lawyers. The aim of this Article is to
help take a clear view of departures from a uniform standard of care in
tort law, and to evaluate in a clear-headed way the costs and benefits of a
subjective standard.
As adumbrated above, a major source of confusion is the
unfortunate myopia in the law and economics literature-a literature that
could and should offer useful clarity in these matters. From an economic
perspective, the "optimal" standard of care is one that minimizes total
social costs. These social costs are usually considered to be the costs of
accidents ("accident costs") plus the costs of precautions against
accidents ("precaution costs"). 18 Both accident costs and precaution
costs depend on the level of care taken; typically, as the amount of care
rises, precaution costs go up while accident costs go down. If we seek to
minimize social costs, the standard of care should be set at the point
where the marginal benefits of additional care are zero-that is, where
the benefits of any additional precaution begin to be outweighed by the
costs.
What matters in setting the standard of care, then, are not total
social costs, but marginal social costs. Individuals with higher-than-
average marginal gains from taking additional precautions would
optimally take more precautions, while individuals with lower-than-
average marginal gains from taking additional precautions would
optimally take fewer precautions. In their seminal book, for example,
Richard Posner and William Landes tell us that "[a] potential injurer who
was very clumsy would have a low [optimal level of care] because his
investment in care would be relatively unproductive and his marginal
cost of care would be relatively high; one who had exceptionally quick
reflexes would be highly productive and his marginal cost would be low,
so he would have a high [optimal level of care]."' 19
Posner and Landes emphasize that one important implication of this
model-indeed, the primary implication-is that if, instead of simply
employing an objective standard, a court were to consider the
defendant's individual capacity, the appropriate response would be to
hold highly capable defendants to a higher standard, requiring them to
take greater care than those who are less capable. It is likely that this
18. As we will see, the costs of any enforcement mechanism-i.e., the
administrative costs of the tort system-must also be considered, and are often a crucial
consideration in deciding between a uniform and a subjective standard of care.
19. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
TORT LAW 123-24 (1987).
2013]
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famous result is at least partially responsible for the confident assertion
by many courts and commentators that those with professional skills are
held to a "higher" standard while those with physical disabilities are held
to a "lower" standard. This conclusion, crucially, rests on the
assumption that an unusually skilled injurer would generate large
marginal reductions in social costs by taking additional precautions,
while an unusually unskilled injurer would generate low marginal
reductions in social costs.
This is, however, not necessarily the case. There are, in fact, two
ways that individuals can differ in the amount of social costs they
generate when exercising a given degree of care. First, following Posner
and Landes, individuals can experience different precaution costs in
taking the same amount of care. Alternatively, individuals taking the
same amount of care can cause different amounts of accident costs. In
his landmark book Economic Analysis of Accident Law, Steven Shavell
notes, for example, that "[p]arties may differ with respect to the costs
they incur in exercising care and with respect to the effect that their
exercise of care will have in reducing accident risks.,
20
Perhaps in part based on the assumption that it does not matter, law
and economics scholars have overwhelmingly focused attention on the
former possibility.2 From a purely mathematical perspective, the
distinction between the two scenarios is, indeed, seemingly
inconsequential. In the same book, the usually reliable Shavell explicitly
states that in his analysis "reference will be made, for simplicity, only to
differences in parties' cost of taking care, although what will be said will
plainly bear equally on differences in the effectiveness of their exercise
of care.",22 More recently, in the latest edition of Polinsky and Shavell's
influential Handbook of Law and Economics, Shavell again assures
readers that a model where injurers vary "in their cost of exercising care"
would generate conclusions "similar" to those of a model where injurers
vary in their "likelihood of causing harm.",
23
Accordingly, law and economics scholars have largely followed
Shavell in focusing on scenarios where an injurer with "greater capacity"
or "skill" has a lower marginal cost of care; that is, each additional "unit"
of care will cost the skilled individual less than it would cost the
unskilled individual, resulting in a larger marginal benefit from
20. SHAVELL, supra note 8, at 73.
21. See infra pp. 304-05.
22. SHAVELL, supra note 8, at 73.
23. See Steven Shavell, Liability for Accidents, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND
EcoNoMics 139, 159 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007).
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additional care.24  In other words, the "model" typically presented-
which I will refer to as the "Standard Model"-is that people are all alike
in the accident costs they create at a given level of precaution, but that
some (skilled) individuals will find it easier than others to take additional
precaution.25
While it is true that the two scenarios-lower precaution costs for
skilled injurers or lower accident costs for skilled injurers-are largely
interchangeable as a matter of formal mathematics, the choice makes
enormous practical difference when one attempts to translate the math
back into concrete examples. As applied to many common accident
scenarios and types of precautions, the assumption that individuals differ
in precaution costs but not accident costs leads to dubious conclusions,
and does so in a way that is not always obvious when the discussion is
kept abstract. The simple change in assumptions, dismissed by Shavell
as immaterial, actually leads to sharply different practical conclusions.
In fact, if one instead assumes that unusually skilled injurers
experience the same precaution costs but generate lower accident costs at
a given level of care, the marginal benefit of increased care may actually
be lower for the skilled than for the unskilled. Because skilled injurers
cause less harm at any given level of care, less harm is avoided by taking
additional care. Where this is the case, the Posner-Landes analysis
breaks down-including the most basic prescription that skilled
individuals should optimally be held to a higher standard of care than
unskilled individuals. Instead, skilled individuals should be held to a
lower standard of care.
Some simple, everyday examples can aid in understanding. For the
Standard Model, we can borrow a classic example from Shavell: a
strong person could more easily clear a sidewalk of ice and snow than
could a frail person, producing a larger marginal reduction in social costs
(the same reduction in accidents for less investment in precaution).26 But
compare another example. Consider the most basic precaution the driver
of a car can take: slowing down. There is no reason to think that the
costs the skilled driver bears by going slower-primarily the opportunity
cost of her time-will be any lower than for an unskilled driver. Her
24. More general models are often more abstract, but typically retain the assumption
of greater marginal reductions in cost from care for highly capable individuals.
25. The term "skilled" is used throughout in a special sense. Greater "skill" in this
context simply means an ability to achieve a lower level of accident costs for a given
expenditure in precaution costs-it does not mean "safer." It is entirely possible for a
person to be "skilled" but dangerously reckless, or "unskilled" but extremely cautious
and safe. Potential examples of "skill," as it used here, include unusual strength,
knowledge, technological sophistication, agility, quick reflexes, and situational
awareness.
26. See SHAVELL, supra note 8, at 74.
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slowing down is also not likely to be more productive in reducing
accident costs. In fact, the contrary is likely true.27 There is every reason
to think that speeding by an unskilled driver will cause more accidents
than speeding by a skilled driver. Consequently, slowing down would
avoid more accidents for the ordinary driver than for the highly skilled
driver. The result is that the skilled driver produces a smaller marginal
reduction in social costs by taking additional precaution (fewer accidents
avoided for the same investment in precaution).
By being sensitive to context and choosing the assumptions that
best apply for the situation and precautions under consideration, we can
move beyond the unhelpful conclusion that subjective standards are "not
higher, not lower, just different." Sometimes they are higher and
sometimes lower, but for good and knowable reasons. Where skilled
injurers experience lower precaution costs than normal, but generate the
same accident costs at a given level of precaution, they should ideally be
required to exercise greater precaution. Where skilled injurers generate
lower accident costs than normal at a given level of precaution, but face
the same precaution costs as anyone else, they should ideally be allowed
to exercise less precaution.
For a mathematically inclined economist, it is not too difficult, if
one actually muddles through the equations, to see that a skilled injurer
can produce either a higher- or lower-than-average marginal gain from
additional care, depending on the circumstances. From this fact naturally
emerges the prescription just described. Yet one scours the law and
economics literature in vain for a straightforward explanation of this
(hardly incidental) idea. Furthermore, as I will demonstrate below, this
initial insight leads to a number of important and surprising conclusions
that are far from obvious.
The core of this Article answers the questions posed at the outset by
analyzing the scenario ignored by Shavell and other law and economics
scholars: situations where individuals vary in their likelihood of causing
harm, rather than in their cost of taking precautions. In this scenario, an
injurer with greater capacity or skill will generate less risk at any given
level of care, but would incur the same (or similar) costs in taking the
discrete actions or precautions that constitute due care.28 For ease of
expression, I will refer to this set of assumptions as the "Inverse Model"
to emphasize the contrast with the typical assumptions found in the
27. See infra pp. 322-24. Shavell and others, of course, do not argue that unskilled
drivers should be permitted to drive faster than skilled drivers. As detailed more fully
below, however, Shavell avoids this absurd prediction not by positing a lower marginal
benefit of care for unskilled injurers, but rather via a more complicated argument
regarding activity levels.
28. See infra pp. 319-21.
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relevant literature. Contra Shavell, the distinction between the two sets
of assumptions matters.
The implications of the analysis below are broad and in many ways
counterintuitive. First, as already suggested, the Inverse Model suggests
that skilled injurers should sometimes be held to a lower standard of
care-a result that is undoubtedly already understood intuitively, but has
not been clearly articulated and explained. In this fashion, the analysis
captures the reasoning behind licensing requirements-allowing people
who can demonstrate certain skills to do things and proceed in ways that
would be too dangerous for the unskilled to do.
The remaining conclusions are less obvious and demonstrate the
value of economic reasoning in uncovering unintuitive results. A
standard prediction of the law and economics literature is that a skilled
injurer faced with a uniform reasonable person standard will simply
conform to the uniform standard, rather than to the (higher) level of care
that the Standard Model tells us would be optimal for the skilled injurer,
thus leading to inefficiency.29  Where the Inverse Model applies,
however, the situation is reversed. When faced with a uniform standard,
a skilled injurer will not conform to it, and instead will conform to the
(lower) level of care that the Inverse Model tells us is optimal for that
injurer. 30 As a result, instead of the uniform reasonable person standard
creating a "pocket" of what effectively is strict liability for the unusually
incapable, 31 it will create a pocket of what effectively is strict liability for
the unusually capable.32 For example, if the assumptions of the Inverse
Model apply, an unusually skilled driver would find it more costly to
obey the speed limit than to simply speed and face liability for any
accidents that result.
33
Even more intriguing, where injurer skill is plastic-that is, where
potential injurers can invest in developing greater skill-the Standard
Model implies that a uniform reasonable person standard can be seen as
guarding against providing disincentives to developing greater skill.
Raising the standard of care for skilled injurers would raise the marginal
cost of developing skills in the first place.34 So, for example, a driver
might decide not to take a course in defensive driving if doing so would
cause her to be held to a higher standard of care. Where the Inverse
29. See infra pp. 297-99.
30. See infra pp. 322-24.
31. See infra p. 311.
32. See infra pp. 327-28.
33. This result assumes-unrealistically, of course-that the speed limit has no legal
significance except as a standard for negligence in tort law. Given sufficiently high fines
for speeding violations, even skilled drivers may choose to adhere to the speed limit.
34. See infra p. 303.
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Model applies, the situation is again reversed, in that tailoring the
standard of care for a skilled injurer would involve lowering the level of
care required, allowing the injurer to capture more of the benefits of
developing skills. As a result, under many plausible conditions, the use
of a uniform reasonable person standard may actually be stifling
desirable investment in innovation and development of greater skill. 35
Finally, and least intuitively, where the Inverse Model applies, a
new form of subsidy for desirable investment in the development of skill
may be possible. Specifically, under the new model, it is possible, under
certain conditions, to enhance efficiency by "over-tailoring" the
negligence standard-allowing skilled injurers to exercise even less care
than is individually optimal-in order to provide additional incentive to
invest in skill.36 Such conditions are never possible where the Standard
Model applies. 37  Over-tailoring the negligence standard offers a
potentially attractive alternative to traditional subsidies, in that it would
allow individuals who would benefit most from the subsidy to self-select.
Part II of this Article provides an overview of the uniform
reasonable person standard as it exists in tort law, and briefly rehearses
the traditional economic arguments in favor of such a standard. Next,
Part III introduces the Standard Model of injurer skill, shows how it has
become the conventional "law and economics story" over the past three
decades, and demonstrates the model's implications for departures from
the uniform standard of care. Part IV then examines how courts actually
determine injurer negligence in various common accident scenarios, and
shows how actual doctrine does not conform to the prescriptions of the
Standard Model. Parts V and VI form the analytical core of this Article.
Part V introduces the Inverse Model and develops it through a simple
example, while Part VI sets forth the major implications of the new
model.
A note is in order at the outset. While the arguments presented
below are, at their heart, economic and even mathematical in nature, 38 I
have strived to present them in words rather than equations. 39 The use of
formal mathematics would undoubtedly make the paper shorter, and
likely easier to follow for the mathematically inclined. That is the great
value of abstraction-it makes it easier to hold in the mind (and on the
35. Seeinfrapp.329-31.
36. See infra pp. 331-33.
37. Unfortunately, it is difficult to present an easily comprehended example at the
outset-the reader will simply have to bear with me.
38. In particular, I stick entirely to a simple economic conception of social costs, and
do not consider concepts like fairness, morality, or cultural norms and expectations.
39. Where I believe equations may be of assistance to some readers, I have relegated
them to the footnotes.
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page) arguments and relationships that might otherwise grow unwieldy.4°
But proceeding mathematically would threaten to perpetuate the very
problem of over-abstraction I intend to highlight. The broader purpose
of this Article is to serve as a reminder of the insights that can be lost in
translation when the concrete does not inform the abstract, and vice
versa. Only by persistently translating the abstract into the concrete can
we ensure that the abstract does not cross over into the artificial.
II. THE UNIFORM REASONABLE PERSON STANDARD
A. The Uniform Standard
One of the first things an aspiring lawyer learns in a first-year torts
class is that, over a wide range of situations, tort law imposes a duty to
behave as a reasonable person would under the circumstances.41 If a
defendant is found to have breached this duty-in other words, to have
exercised less care than a reasonable person would have under the
circumstances-then the defendant is negligent, and can generally be
held liable for any injury his negligence caused.42
The next thing a beginning student usually learns is that this
"reasonable person standard" is an objective, uniform standard. In
deciding whether a defendant was negligent, the law compares his
conduct to that of a hypothetical ordinary reasonable person, and not to a
person with the defendant's specific attributes and abilities or
infirmities.43  As Oliver Wendell Holmes phrased it, a man's
40. In part because of this commitment to avoiding mathematical formalism where
possible, I consider only the simplest unilateral accident scenarios, where only the
defendant's level of precaution affects the expected level of accident costs. Only an
extreme masochist would consider more complicated multilateral accidents, involving
questions of comparative fault, without the shorthand of mathematics.
41. See, e.g., Heaven v. Pender, II Q.B.D. 503, 509 (1883); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 (2005).
42. Technically, the tort of negligence consists of four elements: (1) duty;
(2) breach; (3) actual and proximate causation; and (4) injury. A defendant will not be
liable for the tort of negligence unless all four elements are satisfied. It is conventionally
said, however, that a person who has breached an applicable duty of care has been
"negligent." To avoid unnecessary linguistic gymnastics, this Article will adopt this
convention, and refer to conduct that breaches the applicable standard of care as
"negligence," and a person who engages in such conduct as "negligent."
43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1965) ("The [negligence standard]
must be an objective and external one, rather than that of the individual judgment, good
or bad, of the particular individual. It must be the same for all persons, since the law can
have no favorites .. "). The reasonable person standard is objective in a second
important way as well, that will be discussed further infra pp. 313-14. The standard
looks to the defendant's actual, objective, external conduct-something that can be
directly observed-and asks whether that conduct was reasonably careful. It does not
delve into the defendant's subjective internal state of mind-which cannot be directly
observed-and ask whether he was really "trying his best" to be careful. JOHN C.P.
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"neighbors... require him, at his proper peril, to come up to their
standard, and the courts which they establish decline to take his personal
equation into account." 4
The best-known early precedent for the rule that the reasonable
person standard of negligence law is an objective standard is Vaughan v.
Menlove.45 In Menlove, the defendant (Menlove), a farmer, had stacked
moist hay in a manner that risked spontaneous combustion, despite the
repeated warnings and protestations of his neighbors.46 Eventually, the
hay ignited and the fire spread, burning down a neighbor's cottages.
When the neighbor sued, claiming that Menlove had not behaved as a
"prudent man" would under the circumstances, Menlove's defense was,
in essence, that he was not a prudent man-he was a fool-and that the
law should not expect him to behave as a prudent man would behave. As
Menlove's attorney put it, Menlove had the "misfortune of not
possessing the highest order of intelligence," and rather than being
required to behave like an ordinary prudent man, he should only be
required to behave "bona fide to the best of his judgment."47
The English court rejected this provocative argument, holding that
"[i]nstead... of saying that the liability for negligence should be co-
extensive with the judgment of each individual, which would be as
variable as the length of the foot of each individual, we ought rather to
adhere to the rule which requires in all cases a regard to caution such as a
man of ordinary prudence would observe., 48 It is still largely the case
that "[a]n individual whose ability to take care is below average, perhaps
because he has poor reflexes, is not excused on that account, and an
individual who is above average in his ability to take care-perhaps
because of exceptionally good reflexes-generally is not held to a higher
standard than the average person would be.",
49
GOLDBERG ET AL., TORT LAW: RESPONSIBILITIES AND REDRESS 168-69 (3d ed. 2012). By
contrast, many aspects of criminal law-the majority standard for entrapment, to take one
example-apply subjective standards. See Andrew Carlon, Entrapment, Punishment, and
the Sadistic State, 93 VA. L. REv. 1081, 1089 (2007) (noting that the majority of
jurisdictions utilize a "subjective" standard for entrapment); Andrew H. Constinett, "In a
Puff of Smoke": Drug Crime and the Perils of Subjective Entrapment, 48 AM. CRIM. L.
REv. 1757-58 (2011).
44. HOLMES, supra note 2, at 108.
45. Vaughan v. Menlove, (1837) 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.P.); 3 Bing. 468 (N.C.).
46. Id. at 490-91.
47. Id. at 492.
48. Id at 493.
49. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 19, at 126 (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 173-93 (5th ed. 1984)); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 11
cmt. a (2005) ("[A] person's claim of being born clumsy would not be regarded as
relevant [to a negligence inquiry].").
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B. Costs of an Objective Standard
The use of a uniform reasonable person standard creates some
genuine allocative inefficiencies, in addition to any unfairness it might
entail.50 To understand why, it is helpful to consider a simple economic
model of the costs associated with accidents. For each potential injurer
undertaking a given activity, there is an "efficient" or "optimal" level of
care that minimizes the social costs of accidents, which are the sum of
the losses to others from injuries caused by the activity 51 and the
precaution costs associated with taking care to avoid additional injuries.52
In general, both losses and precaution costs are functions of the amount
of care taken, with precaution costs increasing and losses decreasing as
care increases.53 The individually optimal standard of care is found
where the marginal costs of additional care are equal to the marginal
reduction in losses with additional care, such that any additional
increment of care would cost more than the accidents that would be
avoided.
Where an injurer exercises an optimal level of care, she takes all
cost-justified precautions, and only cost-justified precautions. If the
50. While it is certainly possible to defend the objective reasonable person standard
on fairness grounds, the standard is generally viewed as something of a challenge for
moralistic accounts of tort law. After all, where are notions of "moral responsibility"
when someone is held to a reasonable person standard they cannot-and even should
not-meet? See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Misunderstanding Ability, Misallocating
Responsibility, 68 BROOK. L. REv. 1055, 1057 (2003) ("[T]he reasonable person test
might . . . produce results wholly inconsistent with ordinary notions of justice and
fairness."). As a result, defenses of the objective reasonable person standard, like the
ones considered infra, tend to be largely functional and economic in nature. See, e.g.,
Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Nobody's Fools: The Rational Audience as First Amendment
Ideal, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 799, 842-43 ("Although the reasonable person standard
seems unfair or unjust because it holds individuals to cognitive standards they cannot
meet, it makes the negligence inquiry 'tractable' for lawyers and juries."). But see
Richard W. Wright, The Standards of Care in Negligence Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 249, 257-59 (David G. Owen ed., 1995) (suggesting that an
objective standard is consistent with Kantian morality); Jules L. Coleman, Legal Theory
and Practice, 83 GEO. L.J. 2579, 2603-04 (1995) (defending an objective standard as
comporting with a reasonable conception of liberty and security). At any rate, this paper
will focus exclusively on efficiency, ignoring admittedly important questions of fairness
and justice.
51. Of course, the injurer herself may suffer injuries from accidents she causes.
Because these costs are borne by the injurer, however, they can simply be rolled into the
calculation of precaution costs without affecting the analysis (i.e., a precaution that costs
the injurer $3 while preventing $2 in injuries to the injurer can simply be treated as
generating a net precaution cost of $1).
52. See GUIDO CALA3RESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 26 (1970).
53. Following the literature, L' < 0 < L", meaning that additional care reduces
expected losses at a decreasing rate. Phrased differently, there are diminishing returns to
additional care. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 19, at 59. The marginal cost of care
is also assumed to be positive and non-decreasing (P' > 0; P" > 0).
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injurer takes less than the optimal level of care, she will be causing
injuries that would cost less to avoid than to pay for. If the injurer takes
more care than the optimal level of care, she will be avoiding injuries
that would cost less to pay for than to avoid. Thus, any deviation from
the individually optimal level of care creates social inefficiency, because
the injurer is either failing to take cost-justified precautions, or is taking
precautions that are not cost-justified.
The use of an objective reasonable person standard, rather than an
optimal standard tailored to each individual, induces some injurers to
deviate from the individually optimal level of care, thus creating social
costs. To understand why injurers deviate from the individually optimal
level of care, it is helpful to consider the incentives faced by injurers
under a negligence regime using a reasonable person standard. Under an
objective reasonable person standard, where the injurer has taken care
greater to or equal to the level required by the reasonable person
standard, she faces only the costs of taking such care, and will not be
held liable for any injuries she may nevertheless cause.54 Where the
injurer takes less care than is required by the reasonable person standard,
she is negligent, and will bear both the cost of care and also the costs of
being held liable for the injuries caused by her negligence. These
liability costs are simply the difference between the expected injuries at
the injurer's actual level of care and the expected injuries at the
reasonable person standard of care."
Faced with these costs, an injurer for whom the individually optimal
standard of care is less than the uniform reasonable person standard will
only exercise care at the individually optimal level, even though doing so
exposes her to liability. For these injurers, any care above the
54. For purposes of this analysis, the possibility of contributory negligence is
ignored, as consideration of victim care would complicate the analysis without altering
the results.
55. Many law and economics formulations neglect to subtract out the injuries that
would have occurred even had the injurer exercised reasonable care. See, e.g., LANDES &
POSNER, supra note 19, at 75. This simpler formulation-which leads to a similar
analysis-is not a technically accurate description of tort doctrine. A negligent injurer is
not responsible for all injuries caused by her activities; she is only responsible for injuries
caused by her negligence. See Martin v. Herzog, 126 N.E. 814, 816 (N.Y. 1920) ("A
defendant who travels without lights is not to pay damages for his fault, unless the
absence of lights is the cause of the disaster .... Proof of negligence in the air, so to
speak, will not do.") (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); Berry v. Sugar
Notch Borough, 43 A. 240 (Pa. 1899); Mark F. Grady, A New Positive Economic Theory
of Negligence, 92 YALE L.J. 799 (1983); Marcel Kahan, Causation and Incentives to Take
Care Under the Negligence Rule, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 427 (1989). In practice, of course, it
may be difficult to determine whether an accident would have occurred even in the
absence of negligence, and courts may err on the side of imposing liability on negligent
defendants. This possibility-or rather the anticipation of this possibility-can lead to
additional allocative inefficiencies. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 19, at 124.
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individually optimal level will cost more than the accidents such care
avoids. The injurer would thus find it "too costly to bring himself up to
[the uniform reasonable person standard] relative to the benefits of
avoiding liability for the victim's damages. 56  This, somewhat
counterintuitively, is a socially efficient result insofar as the injurer
would remain at the individually optimal level of care, rather than
wasting resources measuring up to a reasonable person level that is too
stringent for her.57
The news is less sanguine with regard to injurers for whom the
individually optimal standard of care is greater than the reasonable
person standard. These individuals will find it in their best interest to
exercise care only up to the level of the reasonable person standard,
because this will be sufficient to relieve them of all liability. Any
additional care would impose greater precaution costs on the injurer,
without relieving him of any losses he would otherwise bear. 5' As a
result, such an injurer will use less care than would be individually
optimal, causing injuries it would cost less to avoid-a socially
inefficient result brought about by the use of an objective reasonable
person standard. Given that individual capacity for care is likely to be,
as the Menlove court phrased it, "as variable as the length of the foot,"'5 9
this inefficiency is almost certainly pervasive.60
C. Economic Justifications for an Objective Standard
If the objective reasonable person standard generates inefficiency,
why is it such a bedrock rule of negligence law? If measuring an
individual's capabilities were as easy as measuring the length of his foot,
it might not be. To understand the objective standard, at least from an
economic perspective, we must consider the other component of
Calabresi's "costs of accidents"-the costs of administering the torts
56. LANDES &POSNER, supra note 19, at 125.
57. If, as discussed supra note 51, the injurer for whom the individually optimal
level of care is less than the reasonable person standard anticipates that a court may
impose the costs of all accidents she causes on her-rather than just those caused by her
negligence-then she might decide to raise her level of care to the reasonable person
standard in order to avoid all liability. See id. at 124-25. This would represent an
inefficient result, in that the injurer would be incurring more precaution costs than the
injury costs avoided thereby.
58. See id. at 124 (noting that the injurer "has no incentive to use more than [x] * care
(the reasonable-man standard) because to do so would increase his costs without reducing
his expected liability, which, by assumption, is already zero.").
59. Vaughan v. Menlove, (1837) 132 Eng. Rep. 490, 493 (C.P.); 3 Bing. 468 (N.C.).
60. Alfred Endres & Tim Friehe, The Reasonable Person Standard: Trading Off
Static and Dynamic Efficiency, EUR. J.L. & EcoN., Nov. 11, 2011, at 4 ("It is by now well
established that the reasonable person standard is disadvantageous because it holds
parties investing different levels of precaution costs to the same level of care.").
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system. 61  The alternative to an objective standard-a personalized
negligence standard-would require courts to assess an individual
defendant's capabilities and tailor the standard of care to those
capabilities. The costs of doing so are likely to be high, especially in
light of the fact that many litigants would have every incentive to conceal
their true capabilities. After all, what is to prevent a defendant from
arguing, like Menlove, that he is a fool or a klutz? As a result, the most
common and powerful economic argument in favor of an objective
standard is that the information and administrative costs associated with
a more tailored standard would be prohibitive in most cases, swamping
any allocative efficiency gains.
62
The exceptions to the general rule appear to confirm that the
difficulty of measuring individual capacity is at the root of the objective
reasonable person standard. While courts will not apply a different
standard to defendants who are merely clumsy, weak, or of low
intelligence, they will take into account many obvious disabilities, such
as blindness, 63 deafness, 64 or lack of a limb. 65 Rather than requiring a
blind person to take the care that a "reasonable person" would take,
courts will only require that they take the care a "reasonable blind
person" would take (including avoiding activities, such as driving, that
would be unreasonable for a blind person to undertake).6 6  Similarly,
licensed professionals, such as doctors, acting within their professional
capacity are generally held to the standard of a "reasonable
61. See CALABRESI, supra note 52, at 28.
62. See, e.g., HOLMES, supra note 2, at 108 (pointing out the impossibility of
"measuring a man's powers and limitations"); LANDES & POSNER, supra note 19, at 126
("The allocative costs of forgoing individual standards of care are undeniable but must be
compared with the costs of ascertaining each individual's due care level, an information
cost."); SHAVELL, supra note 8; Peter A. Diamond, Single Activity Accidents, 3 J. LEGAL
STUD. 107 (1974); Endres & Friehe, supra note 60, at 4 ("In the literature on the
economics of tort law, the rationalization for applying the reasonable person standard by
referring to unobservable precaution costs is well established and generally continues to
be the sole explanation.").
63. See, e.g., Poyner v. Loftus, 694 A.2d 69, 72 (D.C. 1997); Prostran v. City of
Chicago, 811 N.E.2d 364, 368-69 (I1. App. Ct. 2004); Smith v. Sneller, 26 A.2d 452,
453-54 (Pa. 1942); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283C (1965) (collecting
cases).
64. See, e.g., Kerr v. Connecticut Co., 140 A. 751, 752 (Conn. 1928); Jakubiec v.
Hasty, 59 N.W.2d 385, 388 (Mich. 1953); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 283C (1965) (collecting cases).
65. See, e.g., Bianchetti v. Luce, 2 S.W.2d 129, 135 (Mo. Ct. App. 1927); Payne v.
West Chester, 117 A. 335, 335 (Pa. 1922); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 283C (1965) (collecting cases).
66. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 11 cmt. b (2010) ("If, for example, an actor's vision is sufficiently impaired, it is
negligent for that person to drive a car.").
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professional, 67 and children are held to the standard of care of children
of similar age and development.68
With all of these "exceptions" to the usual rule, the defendant's
reduced (or increased) capacity is obvious, relatively easy for a court to
detect and take into account, and difficult or impossible for the defendant
to fake or conceal. 69 The example of mental illness offers further
credence to the notion that information costs are central to the failure of
courts to tailor the negligence standard. Historically, the reasonable
person standard made no allowance for mental illness; there was no
"insanity defense" in tort law. 70  The difficulty in diagnosing mental
illness, the ease of faking it, and the difficulty of taking it into account in
tailoring the negligence standard combined to make the information costs
of a tailored standard prohibitive. As technology and techniques
improve, however-reducing the information costs associated with
diagnosing and evaluating mental illness-applying an objective
standard to the mentally ill may become increasingly dubious. 7
1
Section 12 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts makes a more
sweeping statement that "[i]f an actor has skills or knowledge that
exceed those possessed by most others, these skills or knowledge are
67. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A (1965).
68. See Dickeson v. Balt. & Ohio Chi. Terminal R.R., 245 N.E.2d 762, 764-65 (Ill.
1969); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 10 (2010).
69. As the latest Restatement puts it, "[t]he physical disabilities [the negligence
standard] takes into account generally need to be significant and objectively verifiable.
For reasons relati[ve] to convenience of administration, it is not worthwhile to attempt to
take into account disabilities that are minor or not susceptible to objective verification."
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 11
cmt a (2010). See also LANDES & POSNER, supra note 19, at 123 ("If the costs to the
courts of informing themselves about an individual's ability to avoid accidents were zero,
they would set a different due care level for each individual in every accident case."); id.
at 127 ("In types of case [sic] where the information costs of departing from the average-
man standard are low because the gap between the average individual's due care level
and that of the individual defendant is large and palpable, the courts, as predicted,
recognize a different standard.").
70. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 464, 469 (6th Cir. 2005); Breunig v.
Am. Family Ins. Co., 173 N.W.2d 619, 623-24 (Wis. 1970); In re Meyer's Guardianship,
261 N.W. 211, 213 (Wis. 1935); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B
(1965) ("[l]nsanity or other mental deficiency does not relieve the actor from liability for
conduct which does not conform to the standard of a reasonable man under like
circumstances.").
71. See Okainer Christian Dark, Tort Liability and the "Unquiet Mind": A Proposal
to Incorporate Mental Disabilities into the Standard of Care, 29 T. MARSHALL L. REv.
311 (2004); Elizabeth J. Goldstein, Asking the Impossible: Negligence Liability of the
Mentally Ill, 12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 67 (1995); Harry J.F. Korrell, The
Liability of Mentally Disabled Tort Defendants, 19 LAW & PSYCHOL. REv. 1 (1995);
Kristin Harlow, Note, Applying the Reasonable Person Standard to Psychosis: How Tort
Law Unfairly Burdens Adults with Mental Illness, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1733 (2007).
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circumstances to be taken into account in determining whether the actor
has behaved as a reasonably careful person., 72 The reporters, however,
suggest that outside of "distinctively dangerous" activities and
preexisting relationships involving representations of special skill-such
as the doctor-patient relationship--"the case on behalf of the rule in this
Section is less compelling., 73 Indeed, other than cases where courts used
expert skills to impart knowledge to the defendant that potentially
rendered his or her conduct negligent,74 the reporters are unable to cite a
case involving strangers where the defendant's special skills resulted in a
special standard of care." The reporters do, however, acknowledge the
manifest possibility that jurors might consider the defendant's level of
skill sub silentio.
Recently, German economists Alfred Endres and Tim Friehe have
formalized a somewhat subtler economic argument in favor of a uniform
negligence standard, one that does not depend on the difficulty of
determining an individual injurer's capacity for care.76 Instead, Endres
and Friehe "identify a potential trade-off between static and dynamic
efficiency. , 7  The intuition behind the argument is simple. The
inefficiency associated with a uniform standard is a "static"
inefficiency-it treats the parties' "skill," or capacity for care, as fixed,
and gives suboptimal incentives for exercising care. But in many
situations, an injurer's skill level is dynamic, not fixed. Technology
progresses. Skills develop. Indeed, potential injurers can invest
resources in developing greater skill or capacity for care: a car
manufacturer can work to invent an improved braking system; a drug
72. See RESTATEMENT (TIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 12 (2010).
73. Id. § 12 cmt. a.
74. See, e.g., Everett v. Bucky Warren, Inc., 380 N.E.2d 653, 658-59 (Mass. 1978)
(finding that a hockey coach's extra knowledge and experience could be evidence of his
negligence in supplying unsafe helmets); Hill v. Sparks, 546 S.W.2d 473, 476 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1976) (finding that an experienced machine operator's special knowledge of the
dangerousness of a machine could be considered by the jury in determining his potential
negligence).
75. A Maryland court faced with the question noted that while "the question has
never been precisely asked or answered by our appellate courts, dicta strongly indicate
that neither the inexperience of a novice nor the professional experience of a truck driver
affects the standard of care required of a driver." Capital Raceway Promotions, Inc. v.
Smith, 322 A.2d 238, 246 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1974).
76. See generally Endres & Friehe, supra note 60. Endres and Friehe are both
professors of economics-Endres at the University of Hagen, and Friehe at the
University of Konstanz.
77. Id. at 2.
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manufacturer can research compounds with fewer side effects; a driver
can take a course in defensive driving.
78
If, after an injurer has devoted resources to developing greater skill,
a court were then to tailor the negligence standard by holding the injurer
to a higher standard of care, the court would effectively be raising the
marginal cost of developing greater skill by requiring the injurer to
exercise greater care than if she had simply decided to remain less
skilled. As a result, tailoring the standard of care to an individual's skill
level can lead to sub-optimal investment in developing greater skill in the
first place.79 Section 12 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts explicitly
recognizes this concern, and Endres and Friehe formalize it.
80
Under an array of plausible circumstances, this "dynamic"
inefficiency can outweigh the "static" inefficiency associated with a
uniform reasonable person standard, thus making an objective negligence
standard preferable to a tailored one. 81 In other words, there is a trade-
off between "dynamic efficiency" (creating efficient incentives for
developing greater skill) and "static efficiency" (creating efficient
incentives for exercising care for a potential injurer with a given level of
skill).82 The reasonable person standard achieves dynamic efficiency at a
cost to static efficiency, while a tailored standard achieves static
efficiency at a cost to dynamic efficiency. Which type of standard is
preferable depends on the circumstances. Courts pursuing efficiency
should choose a uniform reasonable person standard wherever the
combined information costs and dynamic inefficiencies of a tailored
standard outweigh the static inefficiencies of a uniform standard. Thus,
we arrive at the somewhat comforting conclusion that even where a
tailored standard is possible, the uniform standard courts actually use
may often be preferable.
78. As Endres & Friehe put it, "care technology may be affected by innovative
activities." Id. at 5.
79. This is not, in itself, a novel insight. The latest Restatement notes that:
[T]o impose a higher level of liability on parties who have improved their
knowledge and skills might have the effect, at least at the margin, of
discouraging parties from making such improvements; in deciding whether to
make the effort to acquire additional knowledge and skills, persons can
anticipate that such an effort will impose on them a heightened burden of
liability.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 12
cmt. a (2010).
80. See id.
81. Endres & Friehe, supra note 60, at 2, 16 ("[T]he static inefficiency due to the use
of the reasonable person standard may sometimes be worth tolerating, because of the
incentives the uniform due care level induces with respect to investments in progressing
care technology.").
82. Id. at 2 ("[W]e identify a potential trade-off between static and dynamic
efficiency.").
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This argument, however-together with much of the conventional
economic analysis of the uniform reasonable person standard-depends
on a particular model of injurer "skill," which is introduced in the next
Part.
III. THE STANDARD MODEL OF INJURER CAPACITY
A. The Standard Model
Recall that "skill" as used here simply means any capability that
allows a potential injurer to achieve a lower level of accident costs for a
given expenditure in precaution costs. Thus, "skill" can be anything
from straightforward physical capabilities like strength and agility, to
special knowledge like medical expertise, to technological sophistication
allowing cheaper manufacturing of safety features. The abstract
mathematics in the specialist literature on the economics of tort law
allow for the possibility that lower accident costs can result from lower
costs of precaution or lower accident costs at a given level of precaution.
In translating the abstract to the concrete, however, the law and
economics literature has almost exclusively focused only on the first
possibility-treating an unusually unskilled individual as having an
unusually high marginal cost of care, and an unusually skilled individual
as having an unusually low marginal cost of care. 83 At the same time,
the expected level of accident costs are assumed to be the same for all
potential injurers exercising a given level of care, regardless of the skill
level of the potential injurer. The alternative possibility is mentioned
only in passing, if at all.
In this respect, Shavell's treatment of the subject is illustrative-and
perhaps, due to his strong reputation, partly responsible for the Standard
Model's use as a starting point in subsequent works. In his landmark
work Economic Analysis of Accident Law, Shavell opens his discussion
of differences among parties by noting that "[p]arties may differ with
respect to the costs they incur in exercising care and with respect to the
effect that their exercise of care will have in reducing accident risks.
84
For the sake of "simplicity," however, Shavell limits his analysis "only
to differences in parties' cost of taking care," while assuring the reader
83. Again, recall Landes and Posner's claim that:
A potential injurer who was very clumsy would have a low [optimal level of
care] because his investment in care would be relatively unproductive and his
marginal cost of care would be relatively high; one who had exceptionally
quick reflexes would be highly productive and his marginal cost would be low,
so he would have a high [optimal level of care].
LANDES & POSNER, supra note 19, at 123-24.
84. See SHAVELL, supra note 8, at 73.
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that "what will be said will plainly bear equally on differences in the
effectiveness of their exercise of care."8' 5 As an example, he considers
the precaution of clearing a sidewalk of ice, noting that a "young, able-
bodied person"--a "skilled" individual, as the term is being used here-
will be able to clear the sidewalk with relative ease, while an "elderly
individual" will find the task extremely difficult. 6
These assumptions of varying costs of exercising care and uniform
accident costs at a given level of care are what one typically finds in the
law and economics literature intended for a general legal audience.8 7 As
such, these assumptions will be referred to, collectively, as the "Standard
Model. 88 The Standard Model, however, is far from universal, and is
flatly inapplicable across a wide range of circumstances.
B. Implications of the Standard Model
In order to explore the implications of the Standard Model, assume,
for simplicity's sake, that there are two types of injurers in the world-
normal "unskilled" injurers and unusual "skilled" injurers.8 9  These
injurers exercise some level of care, impose losses on others from
accidents, and bear precaution costs themselves. For the two types of
injurers, these costs vary with the level of care. Under the Standard
Model, skilled injurers generate the same level of expected losses as
85. Id.
86. In his mathematical treatment, Shavell sets k as the per-unit cost of exercising
care for an injurer of type k, such that an injurer of type k experiences a cost of kx. In
Shavell's model, all injurers cause the same level of accidents l(x) at a given level of care
x. Id. at 86.
87. See, e.g.,Warren F. Schwartz, Objective and Subjective Standards of Negligence:
Defining the Reasonable Person to Induce Optimal Care and Optimal Populations of
Injurers and Victims, 78 GEO. L.J. 241, 243 (1989).
The sighted person is better able to take care in the sense that she can achieve
each reduction in the risk of harm at a lower cost than is possible for the blind
person. Graphically, . . . the marginal cost curve of taking care for the blind
person is above that for the sighted person.
Id.; LANDES & POSNER, supra note 19, at 123-28; SHAVELL, supra note 8, at 73-77;
Shavell, supra note 23, at 159; Endres & Friehe, supra note 60, at 4-5; Thomas J. Miceli,
On Negligence Rules and Self Selection, 2 REv. LAW & EcoN. 349, 351 (2006).
88. To fully flesh out the model, one must also make the quite reasonable
assumptions that the marginal cost of additional care is positive and that there are
diminishing returns to additional care. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 19, at 123-24.
89. By "unusual," I simply mean that skilled injurers are rare enough so as not to
appreciably affect the optimal uniform "reasonable person" standard of due care. This
assumption could be relaxed without altering the basic analysis. Shavell, for example,
considers a spectrum of skill levels, definingf(k) as the probability density of k across the
population. See SHAVELL, supra note 8, at 86. Adding more than one potential level of
skill in this fashion complicates the analysis without changing the qualitative results
presented here.
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unskilled injurers at a given level of care, while facing precaution costs
that are lower than the precaution costs faced by unskilled injurers.90
Because accident losses at a given level of care are the same for
both skilled and unskilled injurers, both types of injurers will also
experience the same marginal reduction in such losses with additional
care. 91  Because skilled injurers experience lower costs in taking
additional precaution than unskilled injurers, skilled injurers experience
lower marginal costs of care than unskilled injurers.92 By adding the
requirements that all injurers experience diminishing returns from
additional care and positive, non-decreasing costs of care, 93 we arrive at
the assumptions of the Standard Model, represented graphically in Figure
1.
90. It may help to see this in equation form. The essential features of the
Conventional Model are that Ls(x) = Lu(x) and Ps(x) = SPu(x), with (S < 1), where
Ls(x) represents accident losses caused by a skilled injurer taking care x, and Lu(x)
represents accident losses caused by an unskilled injurer taking care x. Similarly, Ps(x)
is the level of precaution costs experienced by a skilled injurer, Pu(x) is the level of
precaution costs experienced by an unskilled injurer, and S is a factor representing the
reduction in precaution costs experienced by a skilled injurer.
91. That is, aLS/ax = aLU/ox.
92. That is, aPs/ox = SaPulx.




Skill = Lower Marginal Precaution Costs
Q Accident Unskilled
Costs Precaution Costs -
- - Skilled
- -- - Precaution Costs
Level of Care
Figure 1. This graph shows the basic assumptions of the
Conventional Model. Accident costs for both types of injurers are
represented by the solid black curve. Precaution costs for unskilled
injurers are represented by the solid gray curve, while precaution
costs for skilled injurers are represented by the dashed gray curve.
Note that, in accordance with the assumptions of the Conventional
Model, precaution costs are lower for the skilled than the unskilled
(the dashed gray curve is always below the solid gray curve), while
accident costs are unaffected by skill.
Under this simple model, the social costs generated by unskilled
injurers are simply the sum of the accident and precaution costs
generated by such injurers. Meanwhile, the social costs generated by
skilled injurers are the sum of the accident costs (which are the same)
and the precaution costs (which are lower) generated by such injurers,
plus the costs, if any, of becoming skilled in the first place.94 A court
seeking to minimize social costs, but prevented by information costs
from individualizing the applicable standard of care, would simply set a
94. That is, SCu = Lu(x) + Pu(x), and SCs = Ls(x) + Ps(x) + I Lu(x) +
SPu(x) + 1, where SCu is the total social cost generated by an unskilled injurer, SCs is
the total social cost generated by a skilled injurer, and I represents the cost, if any, an
individual incurs in becoming skilled. I will assume, with Endres and Friehe, that a court
cannot observe the cost of becoming skilled. See Endres & Friehe, supra note 60, at 6. If
the court could observe the cost of becoming skilled, this cost should be included with
other precaution costs in determining the optimal level of care. In practice, though, if it is
generally prohibitively costly to determine an injurer's level of skill, it should be yet
more difficult to determine the cost to the injurer of attaining that level of skill.
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uniform standard that minimizes the social costs generated by unskilled
injurers.95
A court able (and willing) to tailor the standard of care to the
individual injurer's skill level would impose one standard on unskilled
injurers, but a separate standard of care on skilled injurers that minimizes
the social costs generated by skilled injurers.
96
Lower Standard of Care for Unskilled Injurers
Total Unskilled Total Skilled
0 Social Costs Social CostsU Accident
Costs 0 0
Unskilled Skille
Precaution Costs Precaution Costs
Optimum Optimum
Level of Care Unskilled Standard Skilled Standard
Figure 2. This graph demonstrates how skill affects the optimum
level of care under the Conventional Model. Note that the level of
care that minimizes social costs for the skilled injurer is higher
(further to the right) than the level of care that minimizes social costs
for the unskilled injurer. Note also that this graph ignores the cost, if
any, of becoming skilled.
The standard results previewed in Part II flow naturally from these
considerations. First, as shown in Figure 2, because skilled injurers face
lower marginal costs of care but the same marginal reductions in
accident costs, the optimal standard of care for skilled injurers will be
greater than the uniform reasonable person standard, meaning that a
tailored standard of care would require skilled injurers to exercise greater
care than unskilled injurers. 97 Shavell, for example, suggests that "[i]f
95. Recall our assumption that skilled injurers are sufficiently rare as to not
appreciably affect the optimal uniform standard of care.
96. See SHAVELL, supra note 8, at 86.
97. See, e.g., LANDES & POSNER, supra note 19, at 123-24 ("A potential injurer who
was very clumsy would have a low [optimal level of care] because his investment in care
would be relatively unproductive and his marginal cost of care would be relatively high;
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courts can distinguish the young and able-bodied person who can readily
clear a sidewalk of ice from the elderly person who cannot, the first but
not the second should be found negligent for failing to clear ice."
98
Second, again because the optimal standard of care for skilled
injurers is greater than the uniform reasonable person standard, a skilled
injurer subject to a uniform standard of care will only exercise enough
care to satisfy the uniform standard, rather than the higher, individually
optimal level that would minimize total social costs.99
In addition, though we have been discussing a world with only two
types of injurers, "skilled" and "unskilled," it is also easy to see that an
unusually unskilled injurer-one with an abnormally high marginal cost
of care, rather than an abnormally low marginal cost of care-would not
generally bother living up to the reasonable person standard.1 00 Because
an unusually unskilled injurer would have an optimal level of care that is
less than the uniform reasonable person standard, attempting to raise his
level of care to the uniform standard would cost more in precaution costs
than the liability he would avoid. As a result, under a uniform standard
of care, unusually unskilled injurers will simply exercise the (lower)
level of care that is individually optimal, thus exposing them to potential
liability. The well-known result is that a uniform standard of care creates
a "pocket" of strict liability for unusually unskilled injurers. 1O
Finally, as Endres and Friehe predict, because tailoring the standard
of care would impose higher costs on skilled injurers, such tailoring
would raise the marginal cost of becoming skilled and reduce investment
in developing skill in the first place. That is, there are circumstances
where it would be socially desirable for an individual to invest in
one who had exceptionally quick reflexes would be highly productive and his marginal
cost would be low, so he would have a high [optimal level of care]."); SHAVELL, supra
note 8, at 74 ("The socially optimal level of care of a party for whom the cost of taking
care is low will usually exceed the optimal level of care of a party for whom the cost of
taking care is high."); Shavell, supra note 23, at 159 (concluding that injurers "who are
awkward or inept" will have a "low" optimum standard of care). As discussed below,
Shavell identifies situations where it might be desirable to hold the "awkward or inept" to
a higher standard of care, though the argument still assumes that, as an initial matter, a
low-skill individual will find it more expensive to take additional precaution.
98. SHAVELL, supra note 8, at 74.
99. See supra pp. 297-99; see also SHAVELL, supra note 8, at 8 ("[llnjurers plainly
would not take more than due care, because they will escape liability by taking merely
due care.").
100. See supra pp. 298-99.
101. See MARK A. GEISTFELD, TORT LAW: THE ESSENTIALS 95-98 (2008); LANDES &
POSNER, supra note 19, at 125; SHAVELL, supra note 8, at 88 (showing that unusually
low-skill injurers will choose their individual-optimal level of care, rather than obeying
the negligence standard); Mark A. Geistfeld, Tort Law and the Inherent Limitations of
Monetary Exchange: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and the Negligence Rule, 4 J. TORT
L. 1,9 (2011).
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becoming skilled,10 2 and where they would choose to become skilled
under a uniform standard, but choose to remain unskilled under a tailored
standard. 
03
IV. THE PROBLEMATIC PREDICTIONS OF THE STANDARD MODEL
The discussion in Part III is decidedly abstract. Taken on their own
terms, the conclusions reached seem almost inescapable, and not
obviously problematic. Numerous examples can be given where they
apply naturally. And, in fact, if the conclusions are stated breezily
enough, they seem positively intuitive: high-skill individuals should
optimally be held to a higher standard; low-skill individuals should
optimally be held to a lower standard. That certainly sounds plausible.
Yet if one digs beneath that surface plausibility, problems emerge almost
immediately.
In evaluating the accuracy and usefulness of the Standard Model, it
is absolutely essential to ask how exactly courts attempting to tailor the
standard of due care might use the insights the model provides. Yet this
is seldom done in a diligent fashion. What, in practice, would it mean
for a court to require more skilled injurers to exercise a greater degree of
care? Or, conversely, to require less care from less skilled injurers? For
some types of precautions, the insights of the model are straightforward
to apply. As a result, examples are easy to supply. A technologically
sophisticated automobile manufacturer, for example, could more easily
install safety features like airbags than could a technologically
backwards manufacturer. The Standard Model quite appropriately
suggests that a tailored negligence standard would ideally require the
advanced manufacturer to adopt more safety features than the backwards
manufacturer. Similarly, as suggested by Shavell, the Standard Model
would suggest that it might be optimal for a healthy young homeowner to
be held liable for failing to shovel their front walk, even where it may be
102. It is socially desirable for an individual to invest in becoming skilled when being
skilled reduces total social costs by more than the cost of becoming skilled in the first
place. Using the above formulas, it is socially desirable for an individual to become
skilled when SC, < SCu or, equivalently, when I < (Lu(xu) - Lu(xs)) + (Pu(xu) -
SPu(xs)). When SCg > SCu, it is socially undesirable for an individual to become
skilled-the costs of the investment in skill outweigh the social benefits.
103. Just because it is socially desirable for an individual to become skilled does not
mean it is personally desirable for the individual herself It may be personally
undesirable if the costs of becoming skilled are borne primarily by the individual, but the
benefits accrue primarily to others. A full proof of this result is relatively
straightforward, but more mathematically cumbersome than is desirable here. See
Charles R. Korsmo, Tailoring the Negligence Standard and a New Model of Injurer Skill
17 (July 20, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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inefficient to impose liability for a frail elderly homeowner in the same
circumstances.
For many common activities, however, the Standard Model does not
fit at all, and in fact cannot be properly squared with either intuition or
actual judicial practice. The failure of the literature to spell this out early
and often is puzzling. Two contradictory possibilities suggest
themselves. Either economists believe (erroneously) that the contingent
nature of the Standard Model is obvious and not worth emphasizing, or
they simply have overlooked the limited applicability of the Standard
Model's assumptions.1°4 Whatever the reason, an explanation of the
limitations of the Standard Model has thus far been lacking.
Furthermore, as will be shown below, even if some of the immediate
consequences of an alternative model are relatively straightforward,
others are not and certainly demand explication.
To grasp the limitations of the Standard Model, consider as an
example the single most common tort-producing activity-driving an
automobile.'O How is a court faced with a car crash to assess the level
of care exercised by the drivers? Is there any sensible way for a court to
require a skilled driver to drive "better" than an unskilled driver? It is
commonplace to observe that courts generally confine themselves to
evaluating a party's external conduct, rather than his internal state of
mind or intentions.106 This is another sense in which the uniform
104. I will admit that I find the idea that these important consequences have simply
been overlooked to be difficult to believe. I find it less incredible, however, when I see
an eminent scholar like Daniel Rubinfeld state that "individuals with slower reflexes or
concentration may be forced to drive more slowly than individuals with quicker reflexes"
only pages before-without explaining or even noting the contradiction-he introduces a
version of the Standard Model that implies precisely the opposite. See supra note 10.
105. Car accident cases are by far the most common type of negligence cases. In a
2001 survey of the 75 largest counties in the United States, car accident cases made up
more than 53% of all tort cases that went to trial. See THOMAS H. COHEN & STEVEN K.
SMITH, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CIVIL TRIAL CASES AND VERDICTS IN LARGE
COtNTIES, 2001, at 9 (2004), available at http://l.usa.gov/lcNWYDI. For comparison,
the next two most common types of cases-premises liability and medical malpractice-
constituted only 16% and 14.5% of trials, respectively. Similarly, an earlier study found
that car accident cases represented 60.1% of tort cases in state courts in the nation's 75
largest counties. See STEVEN K. SMITH ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, TORT
CASES IN LARGE COUNTIES 2 (1995), available at http://l.usa.gov/1hty3eh.
106. The greater part of Holmes's classic work, The Common Law, is dedicated to
establishing and defending this proposition. See, e.g., HOLMES, supra note 2, at 50
("[W]hen we are dealing with that part of the law which aims more directly than any
other at establishing standards of conduct, we should expect there more than elsewhere to
find that the tests of liability are external, and independent of the degree of evil in the
particular person's motives or intentions."); id at 110 ("[l]t must be borne in mind that
law only works within the sphere of the senses. If the external phenomena, the manifest
acts and omissions, are such as it requires, it is wholly indifferent to the internal
phenomena of conscience.").
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reasonable person standard is "objective"-it is concerned with the
external manifestations of care, rather than internal states of mind. 107
When applied to negligence, this means that courts confronted with an
accident can rarely ask how "careful" a defendant was being in the
abstract-or, even more abstractly, how "well" the defendant was
performing the relevant activity. Instead, they must simply ask whether
the defendant exhibited the requisite external manifestations of care.
What are the external manifestations of care that a court can and
will consider? They are, of course, as various as the risky activities that
give rise to tort claims in the first place. What are the indicia of care a
court might consider in an automobile accident case? Among the most
common driver-related factors contributing to car accidents are
speeding, °8 distraction by eating or cell phone usage, 109 and drinking. "0
Yet any attempt to fit these extremely common, garden-variety factors
into the Standard Model quickly runs into difficulty.
First of all, what would constitute the exercise of "more care" for
each of these behaviors? With respect to speeding, under most
circumstances, going slower would presumably constitute more care-in
107. GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 43, at 168-69.
108. According to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's Fatality
Analysis Reporting System (FARS), in 2009 excessive speed was a contributing factor in
approximately 31% of all fatal automobile accidents-and necessarily a higher
proportion of the subset of accidents that are due to driver negligence. See U.S. DEP'T OF
TRANSP., NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS, 2009 DATA:
SPEEDING 1 (2012), available at http://1.usa.gov/qNNzCx. Speeding is routinely cited as
constituting negligence. See, e.g., 8 AM. JUR. 2D Automobiles § 762 (2011) (collecting
cases); 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 591 (2013) (collecting cases).
109. According to the same source, approximately 20% of all injury crashes in 2009
involved distracted driving, and 18% of fatalities from distracted driving crashes involved
cell phone use. See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN.,
TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS, DISTRACTED DRIVING 2009, at 1, 3 (2010), available at
http://l.usa.gov/a50NTE. Not surprisingly, eating, cell phone usage, and other distracting
activities are often cited by courts as evidence of negligence. See, e.g., DuPree v. Terry,
273 N.E.2d 630, 632 (I11. App. Ct. 1971) (noting that eating while driving could be
evidence of negligence); Lamb v. Franklin, 976 S.W.2d 339, 344 (Tex. App. 1998)
(same); Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Civil Liability Arising from Use of Cell Phone While
Driving, 36 A.L.R.6th 443, § 5 (2008) (collecting negligence cases involving driving
while on a cell phone). Other distractions, such as "rubbernecking" and "daydreaming,"
are often noted as factors in accidents, though they appear to be less common grounds of
negligence liability, most likely due to problems of proof But see Self v. Dye, 516
S.W.2d 397, 399 (Ark. 1974) (finding that evidence of driver's daydreaming constituted
"substantial evidence of [driver]'s negligence").
110. According to FARS, in 2009, alcohol was a contributing factor in approximately
32% of all fatal automobile accidents. See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., NAT'L HIGHWAY
TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS, 2009 DATA: ALCOHOL-IMPAIRED
DRIVING, 1 (2010), available at http://l1.usa.gov/ghwLtK. Driving over the legal blood
alcohol limit is frequently cited as negligence per se. See 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles §
544 (2013) (collecting cases). An elevated blood alcohol level, even when under the
established legal limit, is also commonly cited as evidence of negligence. Id.
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that it would increase the driver's ability to avoid hazards-and going
faster would represent less care.il' With respect to distraction, reducing
distracting activities-for example, eating and talking on the phone less
frequently-would constitute more care, while increasing these activities
would constitute less care. With respect to drinking, decreasing one's
blood alcohol content would constitute more care, while increasing
alcohol consumption would constitute less care.
Recall that the Standard Model predicts that, but for the information
costs of creating a tailored standard, it would be socially optimal, as an
initial matter, to require the skilled to take more care, and the unskilled to
take less care. When applied to these everyday straightforward indicia of
care, however, this prediction quickly devolves into absurdity.
That this absurdity has previously escaped comment likely stems, at
least in part, fiom the linguistic ambiguity of the term "standard of care."
The term can refer to at least two things. First, as I have been using it, it
could mean the amount of care-the actual discrete precautions-a
potential injurer is required to take. Alternatively, it could refer to the
overall degree of safety a potential injurer is required to achieve. These
are, as will soon be clear, not necessarily equivalent. 112 It is, however, all
too easy to slip back and forth between the two meanings and, in doing
so, become confused. To take just one example, in a well-known paper,
the respected law and economics scholar Daniel Rubinfeld notes that
"individuals with slower reflexes or concentration may be forced to drive
more slowly than individuals with quicker reflexes, thus adding to their
travel time"' 13  a sensible conclusion.
Yet the model Rubinfeld introduces in the very same paper is a
version of the Standard Model. And this model, which assumes that
individual injurers differ such that the unskilled experience higher
precaution costs, as discussed above, implies that the unskilled should
actually take less precaution-the reverse of his example. 114 If one
speaks in the abstract about "standards of care," however, the
contradiction is surprisingly easy to miss. At first blush, it sounds
perfectly reasonable to say that unskilled injurers should be held to a
"lower" standard of care and skilled injurers a "higher" standard of
care-after all, perhaps better drivers should be required to drive
"better." If even a mathematically sophisticated writer like Rubinfeld
111. This is not always the case, of course. Slowing to 25 mph on a freeway where
traffic is moving at 65 mph would certainly not reduce the risk of accident.
112. To give a simple example, even if a blind person drives a car extremely
carefully, he is likely to pose a greater risk than a professional race-car driver speeding
while talking on her cell phone.
113. Rubinfeld, supra note 10, at 377.
114. Id. at 384-87.
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can become confused, the problem is far more acute for the rest of us.
The difficulty is even worse when the discussion is kept, as it often is,
primarily abstract and mathematical.
In addition to avoiding confusion, the discussion above suggests
another reason to keep clear whether one is speaking of "standard of
care" in the sense of degree of safety or amount of precaution. Courts
and regulators can usually only observe the latter in deciding whether a
given defendant should be held liable-it is far easier to determine, for
example, how fast a driver was going than how "well" she was driving.
Degrees of risk and marginal costs of care are generally hidden, while
the level of care taken is more often observable. As a result, courts will
generally consider the defendant's actions-the external manifestations
of care-rather than the overall degree of safety when determining
whether or not to impose liability.
Whether a driver has been negligent will almost always be decided
by looking at the driver's discrete actions-speeding, eating, talking on a
cell phone, and so on.115 As a result, it is no use saying that a court
should simply require a skilled driver to drive "better," or more safely.
The court (often through use of a jury) must decide what actions the
driver can and cannot take without exposing herself to liability. As a
result, for practical purposes, it makes far more sense to discuss "higher"
and "lower" standards of care in terms of the amount of precaution
required, rather than the degree of safety to be achieved. Simply by
following this convention, a great deal of difficulty can be avoided.
The failure to do so has led to great confusion and a missed
opportunity for law and economics. The assumptions of the Standard
Model actually suggest that unskilled drivers should be allowed to drive
faster than skilled drivers. They suggest that unskilled drivers should be
allowed to engage in more distractions than the skilled. It would suggest
that unskilled drivers should be allowed to drive with a higher blood
alcohol content than skilled drivers. Something is evidently amiss with
the Standard Model, when translated into actual legal prescriptions.
To understand what is amiss, it is necessary to return to the
fundamental assumption of the Standard Model-that skilled injurers
experience a lower marginal cost of additional care. In short, the
problem is that this assumption is unlikely to hold for many indicia of
care actually considered by courts, including each of the types of care
just considered. The cost to the driver of driving slowly," 6 for example,
115. Seesuprapp.313-14.
116. In this discussion of "costs" to the driver of certain types of care, it is important
to remember that it is the net costs that are important-that is, the costs of exercising care
minus any benefits the driver might gain from taking additional care. If, for example, it
costs a driver $1000 in lost time to drive more slowly to work each day for a year, but he
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is primarily the opportunity cost of time-the extra time spent driving
rather than in some other, more desirable way. There is no reason to
think, though, that these opportunity costs would be systematically lower
for skilled drivers than for unskilled drivers. Similarly, there is little
reason to think skilled drivers would face systematically lower costs in
avoiding distraction-causing activities like talking on the phone, eating,
texting, or even just daydreaming. 1 7 It is likewise more than a little
peculiar to think that skilled drivers would face systematically lower
costs than unskilled drivers in refraining from driving drunk.
The difficulties with the Standard Model are typically concealed-
or at least partially camouflaged-by the linguistic ambiguity of the term
"care." As noted above, it is easy to misinterpret the Standard Model as
simply suggesting that a tailored standard of care would require skilled
drivers to drive "better"-to achieve greater safety, rather than take
greater precaution. This, however, is not what the model actually says,
not what the assumptions of the model actually imply, and not something
that courts could do even if they so desired. The assumptions of the
Standard Model unmistakably lead to the conclusion that skilled injurers
should take greater precaution, which is not the same thing as saying
that they should generate less risk."
8
The absurdity of the basic predictions of the Standard Model has
also been masked by the availability of other arguments for holding low-
skill injurers to a higher standard of care. Shavell, for example, argues
that for the especially "awkward or inept," the social costs generated by
engaging in a given activity might outweigh the benefits, even where the
person is taking the individually-optimal amount of care. For such
dangers to society, he suggests that a very high standard of care may be
preferable, in order to prevent them from engaging in certain activities in
saves $250 in gas and $250 in reduced expected injury to himself and his vehicle, then
the actual "precaution costs" associated with driving more slowly are $1000 - $250 -
$250 = $500.
117. It could be argued, though perhaps somewhat implausibly, that even if such
precautions may not come at lower marginal cost to the skilled driver, they may create
larger marginal benefits in terms of accidents avoided. The argument would be that
going slower or paying more attention allows skilled drivers to avoid a great many
potential accidents, but would not do much good for unskilled drivers because even if
they were going slower or paying attention, they would still be so clumsy and
incompetent that they would not be able to apprehend or avoid many accidents. See infra
pp. 322-23. This argument strikes me as implausible, but even if it is accepted, it has
quite different implications than the Conventional Model. This is because the lower
marginal costs envisioned by the Conventional Model are entirely internalized by the
potential injurer in deciding how much care to exercise, while higher marginal benefits
are at least partially positive externalities from the point of view of potential injurers. See
infra pp. 329-31 (discussing this distinction and its consequences further).
118. See infra Part V (elaborating this distinction).
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the first place." 9 While this argument can reconcile the problematic
predictions of the Standard Model with actual practice, it still proceeds
from assumption that lower-skill injurers will always generate lower
marginal gains from additional care-an assumption that I will argue in
the next section is unrealistic. Correcting this mistaken assumption
avoids the same ludicrous prescriptions in a more straightforward
fashion, and generates new and superior insights at the same time.
Again, the foregoing should not be read to suggest that the
assumptions of the Standard Model are never appropriate or that they
never reflect reality. The very real insight at the root of the Standard
Model is that skilled injurers should be able to achieve a given level of
risk at lower cost than unskilled injurers. But there are two ways of
reaching this result. The Standard Model reaches it through its
assumption of lower marginal precaution costs, and this is a perfectly
sensible assumption for many potential precautions. In fact, it is
plausible often enough to make it easy to mistakenly believe that it is
universal. A large manufacturer, for example, due to economies of scale,
may have a lower marginal cost of instituting stricter safety inspections
for its products than a small storefront operation. Similarly, a major
rental car supplier may face lower marginal costs in maintaining its
vehicles than individual car owners face. Or, as Shavell returns to
repeatedly, a young, able-bodied person may find it quick and easy to
clear a sidewalk of ice, while an elderly person would find it onerous. 20
But for many-by no means peripheral or inconsequential-types
of precautions, the assumptions of the Standard Model break down,
yielding absurd results. For precautions that impose costs on injurers
that do not systematically vary as a function of injurer skill, the Standard
Model is simply inapplicable. A skeptic of law and economics thinking
can be forgiven for looking at the typical economics presentation of the
negligence standard, comparing it to actual practice, and coming away
thinking that law and economics does not have much insight to offer
about tort law as it is practiced in the real world. This would, however,
be a mistake. The true lesson is that abstract results must be frequently
translated into concrete predictions that can be tested for plausibility.
When they fail the test, the assumptions must be reconsidered.
119. Shavell, supra note 23, at 159. Shavell notes:
Even if the courts can observe injurers' type k, the optimal level of due care
may not be x*(k) for all k; rather optimal due care might be x > x*(k) for all k
above some threshold k'. By setting such a due care standard, engaging in the
activity may become too expensive to be worthwhile for high k types, thus
implicitly combating the problem of excessive engagement in the activity for
these most dangerous types.
Id.
120. See SHAVELL, supra note 8, at 74.
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There is, fortunately, a second set of assumptions that yields the
same result of equal risk at lower cost for skilled injurers. As developed
in Parts V and VI, these assumptions regarding injurer skill are more
readily applicable to such precautions, and both make sense of actual
doctrine and lead to surprising new possibilities.
V. THE INVERSE MODEL OF INJURER CAPACITY
In this Part, the oft-ignored second way for skill to result in lower
social costs-the "Inverse Model"--is introduced, which better accounts
for the types of care actually considered by courts in many common
accident scenarios. Recall that under the Standard Model, the difference
between a skilled and unskilled injurer is that the skilled injurer
experiences lower marginal precaution costs than the unskilled injurer,
while all types of injurers generate the same absolute level of accident
costs at a given level of care. 121 Under the Inverse Model, these
assumptions are flipped-the difference between a skilled and unskilled
injurer is that the skilled injurer generates a lower absolute level of
accident costs at any given level of care, while all types of injurers
experience the same costs of care. 1
22
To put these assumptions in everyday terms, under the Inverse
Model, it costs a skilled driver just as much as an unskilled driver to
drive 55 mph instead of 65 mph, primarily in opportunity costs of time.
At the same time, under the Inverse Model, the skilled driver would
cause fewer expected accidents than the unskilled driver at a given rate
of speed-that is, a skilled driver going 65 mph would cause fewer
expected accidents than an unskilled driver going 65 mph.
A direct comparison to the Standard Model is helpful in
understanding the Inverse Model and drawing out its implications. The
only difference is the manner in which an individual's greater skill
reduces social costs. Just as before, drivers will exercise some level of
care, will impose losses on others from accidents, and will bear
precaution costs. Just as before, there are two types of drivers: skilled
and unskilled. This time, however, both skilled and unskilled drivers
experience the same precaution costs at a given level of care, with the
difference between skilled and unskilled being that skilled drivers
generate lower expected accident costs at that given level of care. 123 The
Inverse Model retains the other assumptions of the Standard Model.
121. See supra p. 305.
122. That is, L '< <L", and P'> 0; P"> 0. See supra note 53. For activities like
driving that also pose some risk to the injurer, the assumption of positive costs of care
must eventually break down for many precautions.
123. For the Inverse Model, the following equations correspond to those in supra note
90 for the Conventional Model: Ls(x) = SLu(x), where (S < 1), and Ps(x) = Pu(x).
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That is, the Inverse Model retains an assumption of diminishing returns
from additional care, and positive, non-decreasing costs of care. The
results of the assumptions of the new model are displayed in Figure 3.
The New Model




Model. Accident costs for unskilled injurers are represented by the
solid black curve, while accident costs for skilled injurers are
represented by the dashed black curve. Note that, in contrast to the
Conventional Model, accident costs are lower for the skilled than the
unskilled (the dashed black curve is always below the solid black
curve), while precaution costs (the ascending gray curve) are
unaffected by skill.
Again, I do not claim that the assumptions of the Inverse Model
apply to all forms of precautions. As noted in Part IV, the Standard
Model's assumptions are manifestly sensible and productive for many
types of precautions, particularly those involving economies of scale or
technological safeguards. Where the Standard Model's assumptions
fail-and the Inverse Model is intended to succeed-is where greater
size or skill does not generate economies of care; most prominently,
where the principal cost of care is the cost of an individual's time or
attention. By distinguishing between precautions where the Standard
Model applies and those where the Inverse Model applies, we will be
able to determine when a skilled injurer should be held to a higher
standard and when he should be held to a lower standard.
The next Part discusses a potential method for determining which
set of assumptions is more accurate for a given type of precaution. In
general, however, it may be useful to keep in mind a distinction,
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introduced by Mark Grady, between "durable" and "nondurable"
precautions. 124 Under Grady's framework, a durable precaution is one
that imposes an upfront precaution cost on the injurer, but then reduces
accident losses over a relatively long period of time without generating
additional precaution costs. 125 Installing new and improved brake pads
would be a relatively durable precaution, as it would entail a single
upfront expenditure, yet reduce expected accident costs over a period of
days, weeks, or months. Conversely, a nondurable precaution is one that
requires frequent or constant investment of precaution costs in order to
remain effective. 126 Driving more slowly is a relatively nondurable
precaution, as it entails a more or less continuous cost in lost time in
order to reduce expected accident costs.
As a general-but by no means infallible-rule of thumb, we might
expect durable precautions to be better represented by the Standard
Model, and nondurable precautions to be better represented by the
Inverse Model. A sophisticated manufacturer (or a skilled mechanic)
may face lower costs in building (or installing) better brakes than would
a technologically backwards manufacturer (or mechanically ignorant
individual). Yet, there is no reason to think a skilled driver has a lower
opportunity cost of time, and thus that it costs her any less than an
unskilled driver to drive more slowly.
Indeed, one way to motivate the assumptions of the Inverse Model
is by thinking of "skill" in some contexts as being a durable substitute for
otherwise nondurable precautions, rather than as a factor that reduces the
cost of durable and nondurable precautions alike. For example, the
exceptionally quick reflexes or excellent situational awareness of a
skilled driver can serve as a durable substitute for driving more slowly-
an upfront investment in developing these skills prevents accidents that
could otherwise be prevented only by incurring the continuous cost of
driving more slowly. To the extent that courts ignore the costs of
becoming skilled in performing the negligence analysis, we arrive at the
assumptions of the Inverse Model-skilled injurers incur the same
precaution costs for the precautions actually observed by courts, but
generate lower accident costs at any given level of these precautions.
VI. IMPLICATIONS OF THE INVERSE MODEL
The Inverse Model allows us to make sense of departures from the
uniform reasonable person standard-explaining why sometimes a
124. Mark F. Grady, Why are People Negligent? Technology, Nondurable
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person with a physical disability or with professional training will be
required to take more precaution, and sometimes will be permitted to
take less precaution. The Inverse Model also sheds light on the
feasibility and desirability of departures from a uniform reasonable
person standard in general. This Part sets forth four major consequences
of the Inverse Model of injurer capacity that differ from the Standard
Model.1 27  The first is relatively straightforward and intuitive. The
remaining three consequences, however, are progressively more complex
and less intuitive, revealing the value of economic thinking in
uncovering surprising results. Most importantly, all four potentially
offer practical guidance to courts and regulators in designing liability
rules that take injurer skill into account.
A. Lower Standard of Care for Skilled Injurers
Recall that one of the basic results of the Standard Model is that
skilled injurers would be required to exercise more care under an
individually tailored standard of care. 128 By contrast, the most obvious
implication of the Inverse Model is that an individually tailored standard
of care would require skilled injurers to exercise less care than unskilled
injurers.'29
Consider again the activity of driving and a world with two types of
drivers-unskilled drivers, who are relatively common, and skilled
drivers, who are relatively rare. Under the Inverse Model, the social
costs generated by an unskilled driver are simply the sum of the accident
costs caused by the unskilled driver, plus the precaution costs
experienced by the driver. Meanwhile, the social costs generated by a
skilled driver are the sum of the accident costs (which are lower) and the
precaution costs (which are the same) generated by a skilled driver, plus
the costs, if any, of becoming skilled in the first place. 130 The social
costs generated by an unskilled driver are unchanged from the Standard
Model-the only change is in the assumptions regarding skilled
127. These differences fly in the face of Shavell's assurance that a model where
injurers vary "in their cost of exercising care" would generate conclusions "similar" to
those of a model where injurers vary in their "likelihood of causing harm." See Shavell,
supra note 23, at 159.
128. See supra pp. 310-12.
129. Indeed, the evident absurdity of the Conventional Model's result when applied to
common types of negligence like speeding and driving drunk is part of what motivates
the assumptions of the Inverse Model.
130. Putting this into the form used in Part V, the social costs generated by driving are
given by SCu = Lu(x) + Pu(x) and SCs = Ls(x) + Ps(x) + I = SLu(x) + Pu(x) + I,
where SCU is the total social cost generated by an unskilled driver, SCS is the total social
cost generated by a skilled driver, and I once again represents the cost, if any, an
individual incurs in becoming skilled.
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injurers-thus the optimal uniform standard of care is the same as that
given by the Standard Model.
As shown in Figure 4, however, under the Inverse Model, the
optimal level of care is less for skilled drivers than for unskilled drivers.
This is so because the marginal benefit of additional care is actually
lower for skilled drivers than for unskilled drivers-the marginal cost of
additional care is the same, while the accident costs avoided are lower. 131
To help see this, consider the following simplified example.
Assume that the skilled driver, with her fast reflexes, can avoid a
pedestrian if she has at least one second to react, while an ordinary driver
requires two seconds to react. Assume each type of driver is driving 40
mph, or approximately 60 feet per second. 132 The skilled driver will hit
any pedestrian who jumps out less than 60 feet from the front of her car,
while the ordinary driver will hit any pedestrian who jumps out less than
120 feet ahead of her car. If the drivers slow to 30 mph, or
approximately 45 feet per second, 133 the skilled driver will now hit any
pedestrian who jumps out within 45 feet of her car, while the ordinary
driver will hit any pedestrian who jumps out within 90 feet.
By slowing down from 40 mph to 30 mph, then, the ordinary driver
decreases the "danger zone" in front of her car by 30 feet (from 120 feet
to 90 feet), while the skilled driver only decreases her danger zone by 15
feet (from 60 feet to 45 feet). The same precaution thus avoids twice as
many accidents for the ordinary driver as for the skilled driver. Facing
similar opportunity costs of time, the marginal value of the precaution of
slowing down is thus greater for the ordinary driver than for the skilled
driver-precisely contrary to the usual assumptions. As a result of this
smaller marginal reduction in social costs from additional care, a court
seeking to tailor the standard of care so as to minimize the social costs
generated by skilled drivers would impose a standard that is lower than
the uniform reasonable person standard.
131. In mathematical terms, aSCs/Ox < aSCu/X.
132. 40 mph is actually 58-2/3 feet per second, but I am rounding for the sake of
simplicity.
133. 30 mph actually equals 44 feet per second.
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Figure 4. This graph demonstrates how skill affects the optimum
level of care under the Inverse Model. Note that, contrary to the
Standard Model, the level of care that minimizes social costs for the
skilled injurer is lower (further to the left) than the level of care that
minimizes social costs for the unskilled injurer. Note also that this
graph ignores any cost of becoming skilled.
This result, unlike the result of the Standard Model, conforms to
common sense for the examples considered above. To continue with the
example of "driving more slowly," the Inverse Model implies that more
skillful drivers should be allowed to drive faster than unskilled drivers-
that, to use arbitrary numbers, a highly skilled driver should be allowed
to drive 75 mph before being found negligent, where unskilled drivers
would be negligent for exceeding 65 mph. As such, the Inverse Model
captures the logic of many licensing requirements in a way the Standard
Model does not. In general, licensing requirements permit individuals
who are able to demonstrate a high degree of skill or training to do
certain things-ranging from driving a semi-truck to scuba diving to
performing a tracheotomy-that would be too risky for the unskilled and
untrained to undertake. In doing so, licenses allow the skilled to forgo
perhaps the most common and effective type of precaution of all: the
precaution of not undertaking the relevant risky activity in the first
place. 134
134. As Landes and Posner put it, "the fact that a person may be incapable of a high
level of care proves not that he cannot avoid an accident at reasonable cost but only that
he cannot avoid it by being more careful. He may be able to avoid it by abandoning or
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This discussion makes clear why it can be misleading to refer to the
"reasonable blind person" standard as always constituting a lower
standard of care-for many types of precautions, a blind person is, and
from an economic perspective ought to be, held to a higher standard. In
fact, it is only by ignoring the precaution costs of reduced activity levels
that the Standard Model's prediction of a lower standard of care for the
unskilled attains its surface plausibility for many scenarios. It may be
true that a reasonable blind person is not required to apprehend or avoid
dangers a reasonable person might be expected to avoid. 135 But it is also
true that a reasonable blind person is required to incur extraordinary
precaution costs by avoiding numerous common activities in which a
reasonable person might freely engage, or by engaging in them only with
extraordinary care. A reasonable blind person would not drive a car at
all, even at the slowest speed or with the utmost care.1 36 A reasonable
blind person does not go jogging beside a busy street, or go bear hunting,
or even walk over unfamiliar terrain without a cane or some other aid.1
37
That the precaution costs of reduced activity levels are often
ignored may be because, following Shavell, the conventional wisdom has
been that while, theoretically, an optimal negligence standard should
consider activity levels, for various practical reasons the actual
negligence standard does not. 138  In cases involving disabilities and
professional skill, however, the negligence standard may not be as blind
to activity levels as is typically assumed. In these contexts, the optimal
activity level for the defendant may quite obviously be either zero or near
zero. When the precaution costs associated with reduced activity levels
are considered, it is evident that the blind or otherwise disabled are very
frequently required to exercise far greater care-as predicted by the
Inverse Model-rather than the superficially lesser care predicted by the
reducing the activity that produces the accident." LANDES & POSNER, supra note 19, at
126. The classic work describing the relationship between care and activity levels is
Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980).
135. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
H-ARM § 11 cmt. b (2005) ("[Disability] can advantage the actor by establishing that the
actor neither knew nor should have known of dangers that would have been known by
others. The blind person, for example, is unable to see dangers that would be readily
observed by others.").
136. See id. ("If, for example, an actor's vision is sufficiently impaired, it is negligent
for that person to drive a car.").
137. As the Restatement notes, "[p]hysical disability can both advantage and
disadvantage actors at trial as the possible negligence of their past conduct is
considered.... [D]epending on the circumstances, a blind actor may be found negligent
for walking over [unfamiliar] terrain without a cane or some other form of assistance."
Id. See also SHAVELL, supra note 8, at 76 ("A nearly blind person, a child, or a mental
incompetent would probably be held responsible for causing an automobile accident,
even if such a person drove with all the care of which he was capable . .
138. See Shavell, supra note 134, at 22-23.
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Standard Model. Many older court decisions-perhaps unmuddled by
modern torts scholarship-straightforwardly acknowledge that the
disabled are obliged to exercise extraordinary care.139  Many
casebooks-particularly those that largely eschew an economic approach
to tort law-also note the possibility that the disabled may sometimes be
required to take greater precaution. 140
This discussion also makes clear why it is similarly misleading to
state that a doctor or other licensed professional, in being held to the
standard of a reasonable professional, is being held to a "higher"
standard of care. 141 A court will, of course, instruct a jury in a medical
malpractice case to compare the defendant's conduct of, say, an
appendectomy, to that of a "reasonable physician," and a reasonable
physician can undoubtedly be expected to perform an appendectomy
more ably than a "reasonable person." But this does not mean that a
skilled professional is being held to a higher standard than that to which
an unskilled layperson would be held. A layperson would almost
certainly face negligence liability-and likely criminal liability-for
attempting an appendectomy at all, except under the direst of
emergencies. Again, the optimal activity level for a layperson
performing appendectomies is going to be near zero. The same goes for
other "professional" conduct, such as filling a prescription or providing
139. See, e.g., Fenneman v. Holden, 22 A. 1049, 1050 (Md. 1891) ("It is text-book
law, and fully sustained by decisions of high repute, that an infirmity in any of the senses
makes it necessary for a person to be more vigilant and cautious in the use of his other
senses."); Keith v. Worcester & B. V. St. Ry. Co., 82 N.E. 680, 681 (Mass. 1907) ("But it
is also correct to say that in the exercise of common prudence one of defective eyesight
must usually as a matter of general knowledge take more care and employ keener
watchfulness in walking upon the streets .. "), cited with approval in Poyner v. Loflus,
694 A.2d 69, 71-72 (D.C. 1997); Winn v. City of Lowell, 83 Mass. (1 Allen) 177, 180
(1861) ("[Clommon prudence required of [a person of poor sight] greater care in walking
upon the streets, and avoiding obstructions, than is required of persons of good sight.").
140. See supra note 9 (collecting citations).
141. Such statements are routine. See, e.g., JANE E. LEHMAN, 14 GEORGIA
JURISPRUDENCE: PERSONAL INJURY AND TORTS § 36:31 (2013) ("[M]edical professionals
are held to a higher standard of care than ordinary negligence."); Meredith J. Duncan,
Legal Malpractice By Any Other Name: Why a Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim Does
Not Smell as Sweet, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1137, 1141 (1999) ("A cause of action for
professional negligence differs from the typical negligence action in that a professional is
held to a higher standard of care than is an ordinary member of society."); Steven A.
Ramirez, The Professional Obligations of Securities Brokers Under Federal Law: An
Antidote for Bubbles?, 70 U. CuN. L. REv. 527, 556-57 (2002) ("Courts have imposed
higher standards upon professionals .. "); Edward G. Durney, Comment, The Warranty
of Merchantability and Computer Software Contracts: A Square Peg Won 't Fit in a
Round Hole, 59 WASH. L. REv. 511, 527 (1984) ("Skilled and highly trained people are
subject to a higher standard than the lay 'reasonable person."'); Lauren Fleischer, Note,
From Pill-Counting to Patient Care: Pharmacists' Standard of Care in Negligence Law,
68 FORDHAM L. REV. 165, 186-87 (1999) ("[P]harmacists, as professionals, must be held
to a higher standard of care than defendants in ordinary negligence actions.").
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legal services. 142 The illusion that skilled professionals are held to a
"higher" standard of care for a given activity is maintained only by
ignoring the requirement that unskilled laypeople avoid the professional
activity altogether.
Thus, the Inverse Model's prediction that the unusually skilled will
be allowed to exercise less care-including undertaking riskier
activities-while the unusually unskilled will be required to exercise
more care-including avoiding risky activities-captures and explains an
aspect of the logic of licensing requirements and tort doctrine that the
Standard Model does not.
B. Skilled Injurers Will Choose Not to Satisfy a Uniform Standard
Providing a coherent explanation of why existing doctrine is
sensible is certainly a good thing, and reason enough to linger on a topic
that has previously been treated only in passing. Further examination,
however, reveals that the Inverse Model also identifies new problems,
and suggests new solutions. The persistent failure heretofore to subject it
to scrutiny has resulted not only in miscommunication and
misunderstanding, but also missed opportunities for new insight. The
next three subsections provide a sketch of a few of these insights.
As discussed in Parts II and III, under the Standard Model, an
unusually unskilled injurer faced with a uniform reasonable person
standard will find it too costly to bring his conduct up to the uniform
standard. Low-skill injurers will instead choose to exercise a lower level
of care that is individually optimal, and face de facto strict liability as a
result. 143 Conversely, a skilled injurer will conform to the uniform
standard, rather than to the higher level of care that would be optimal for
the skilled injurer, thus leading to social inefficiency. 144
The second major implication of the Inverse Model is that where its
assumptions apply, the Standard Model gets it exactly backwards.
Where the Inverse Model applies, it is unskilled injurers who have higher
individually optimal standards of care, and skilled injurers who have
lower individually optimal standards. As a result, the "pocket" of strict
liability created by a uniform standard exists for unusually skilled
injurers, who will find it excessively costly to conform to a uniform
reasonable person standard. Because the skilled injurer's individually
optimal standard of care is less than the uniform standard, raising his
142. Indeed, the unauthorized practice of law is a criminal offense in most states. See
State Definitions of the Practice of Law, A.B.A., http:/ibit.ly/vKszcG (last visited Oct. 21,
2013).
143. Seesuprap.311.
144. See supra pp. 297-99.
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level of care from the individually optimal level to the uniform standard
would cost more in precaution costs than the liability it would avoid. 145
Again, this is actually a socially efficient result insofar as the skilled
injurer would be remaining at the individually optimal level of care. 146
Conversely, where the Inverse Model applies, it will be the
unusually unskilled for whom the individually optimal standard of care is
greater than the uniform reasonable person standard. As a result, the
particularly unskilled will find it in their interest to only exercise care at
the level of the uniform reasonable person standard, because this is
sufficient to relieve them of all liability. Any additional care would cost
the injurer in precaution costs without relieving him of any losses he
would otherwise bear. 147 As before, this will result in some individuals
exercising less care than would be individually optimal, leading to
injuries that would better be avoided.
To put it in everyday terms, the Standard Model would predict that
highly skilled drivers-those with quick reflexes, acute vision, and
excellent situational awareness-would generally drive the speed limit,
while extremely low-skill drivers-those with slow reflexes, failing
vision, and low situational awareness-would routinely (and rationally)
speed. 148 The Inverse Model would predict the opposite-skilled drivers
should routinely and rationally speed, while low-skill drivers should
generally obey speed limits. 
149
145. See supra pp. 298-99 (showing that any time an injurer's individually optimal
standard of care is less than the uniform reasonable person standard, the injurer will
choose not to conform to the uniform standard).
146. See supra pp. 298-99.
147. See supra p. 299.
148. Note that "skilled drivers" is being used in a specific sense, and in this context is
not synonymous with "drivers who cause fewer accidents." It means drivers who cause
fewer accidents at a given level of precaution. A skilled driver who routinely drives 100
mph--or drunk-may cause more accidents than an unskilled driver who never exceeds
55 mph. Thus, even if it were the case that 20 year olds had a higher accident rate than
65 year olds, that would not necessarily imply that 20 year olds are less "skilled" at
driving than 65 year olds, in the sense the term is being used here. Indeed, one prediction
of the new model is that as injurers become more skilled, they will, all else being equal,
tend to reduce their level of precaution, causing injuries at a higher rate than the
Conventional Model would suggest.
149. There is some anecdotal evidence to suggest that this is the case, though I am
unaware of any rigorous research on this score. Certainly professional racecar drivers-
who would have to be considered highly skilled-are known for some fairly spectacular
violations of the traffic laws. See, e.g., Jonathan Welsh, Nascar Driver Busch Gets Ticket
For 128 MPH, WALL ST. J.: DRIVER'S SEAT (May 25, 2011, 3:40 PM),
http://on.wsj.coml isZ2YW; Don Coble, Speeding Off the Track Not the Ticket for
NASCAR Drivers, SAVANNAH MORNING NEWS, Aug. 21, 1999. Similarly, the clichd of a
"Sunday driver"--punctilious to a fault in following traffic regulations-is generally an
elderly Mr. Magoo, with senses and reflexes that have dulled with the passing of the
years. See, e.g., XUEHAO CHU, CTR. FOR URBAN TRANSP. RESEARCH, UNIV. OF S. FLA.,
THE EFFECTS OF AGE ON THE DRIVING HABITS OF THE ELDERLY: EVIDENCE FROM THE 1990
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Beyond the interest this result holds in its own right, this prediction
suggests a potential method for discriminating between precautions for
which the Standard Model is appropriate and those for which the Inverse
Model is preferable. Where the unusually unskilled are more likely to
systematically and rationally violate an applicable uniform standard of
care, the Conventional Model is superior. Where the unusually skilled
are more likely to systematically fail to live up to an applicable uniform
standard of care, the Inverse Model offers a better description of reality.
By this method, policymakers can potentially determine-where it would
not otherwise be obvious-which way standards should be adjusted for
the unusually skilled and the unusually unskilled.
C. Uniform Negligence Standards May Stunt Innovation
The third major implication of the Inverse Model is that a failure to
individually tailor the negligence standard can lead to underinvestment in
developing greater skill.
As noted in Part II, the economists Endres and Friehe have
defended the uniform reasonable person standard on the grounds that
while it sacrifices some degree of static efficiency by failing to tailor the
standard of care to individual capabilities, it may achieve dynamic
efficiency in the process.150 This conclusion is rather comforting. The
traditional "information costs" explanation of the uniform reasonable
person standard acknowledges that a uniform standard is socially
inefficient, but treats it as a necessary evil because of the difficulty of
assessing individual skill. The Endres and Friehe explanation suggests
that even if courts could assess individual skill, a uniform negligence
standard would still be preferable under some circumstances. Where
NATIONAL . PERSONAL TRANSPORTATION STUDY (Oct. 1994), available at
http://1.usa.gov/lbdtQD2 (finding both that the elderly "drive at lower speeds"-an
average of 24% slower than middle-aged and 31% slower than young drivers-yet still
"show a higher risk of crash and injury"); Shani Bromberg, et al., The Perception of
Pedestrians from the Perspective of Elderly Experienced and Experienced Drivers, 44
ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 48, 48 (2012) (finding that elderly drivers partially
compensate for reduced reaction times by driving 20% slower than other experienced
drivers). Of course, with rare exception, speed limits are set by statute, rather than by
courts establishing a reasonable person standard. The multitude of studies showing that
speed limits are almost universally disregarded would suggest that these limits are set
below the optimal level for all but the very worst of drivers. A typical study by the
Department of Transportation found that "lowering speed limits by as much as 20 mi/h
(32 km/h), or raising speed limits by as much as 16 mi/h (24 kmih) had little effect on
motorist speed." U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP. FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., EFFECTS OF RAISING
AND LOWERING SPEED LIMITS (Oct. 1992). The same study notes that "[fqor years, traffic
engineering texts have supported the conclusion that motorists ignore unreasonable speed
limits." Id.
150. See supra pp. 304-05.
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injurer capacity is plastic, the threat of a higher, individually tailored
standard for highly skilled individuals-as prescribed by the Standard
Model-will provide injurers with an incentive to remain unskilled.
Where the Inverse Model applies, the situation is reversed.
Tailoring the standard of care would involve lowering the level of care
required of skilled injurers, allowing the injurer to capture more of the
benefits of developing greater skill. Thus, it is the use of a uniform
negligence standard-thefailure to tailor the standard of care-that may
stifle innovation and skill-development by denying one who develops
greater skill from sharing in the benefits of that skill.
This result can be demonstrated mathematically' 51 but, as before, it
can also be understood intuitively. Increasing one's level of skill by, for
example, becoming a better driver, generates positive externalities-
benefits that are not captured by the individual driver. The skilled driver
inflicts fewer accident costs on the rest of society, in addition to any
benefit to the driver himself. The larger these positive externalities are,
the greater the underinvestment in developing skill. A tailored
negligence standard would relax the standard of care faced by the skilled
driver, thus allowing the skilled driver to internalize more of the benefits
of becoming skilled. As a result, the degree of underinvestment in skill
is reduced, as compared to a uniform negligence standard. The
suggestion that the uniform reasonable person standard might achieve
better results, even in the absence of information costs, no longer holds
where the Inverse Model applies.
The Inverse Model therefore implies that a tailored negligence
standard would be, at least for some types of precautions, an unalloyed
good that should be pursued wherever information costs are not
prohibitive. Furthermore, it may be the case that the information costs
associated with imposing a tailored standard are not so great when the
Inverse Model is applicable. Where the Standard Model applies,
unusually low-skill injurers would benefit from a lower standard of care.
This creates a concern that defendants, like Menlove, might "sandbag" or
"play dumb" in an attempt to escape liability. Where the Inverse Model
applies, however, it is the unusually high-skill injurer who would benefit
from a lower standard of care. A defendant seeking to escape liability,
therefore, would have an incentive to fake unusually high skill. In
practice, however, this will almost always be far more difficult than
faking incapacity. It is difficult to tell whether a person is pretending to
be worse at an activity than he actually is. It is far easier to expose a
person pretending to be better at an activity than he is in actuality. This
phenomenon suggests that, for many types of precautions, tailored
151. See Korsmo, supra note 103, at 27-28.
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negligence standards may be more feasible than has traditionally been
thought." 2
D. "Over-Tailoring" as an Efficient Subsidy to Skill Development
The fourth major implication of the Inverse Model is the least
intuitive, and the one where abstract mathematics would most aid in
comprehension. Nonetheless, the general result can be grasped without
formal mathematics, and in the spirit of the overall endeavor, I will leave
the equations aside. 153 The Inverse Model predicts that situations can
exist where "over-tailoring" the standard of care-allowing individuals
who develop skills to utilize less care than would appear to be
individually optimal--can produce social gains. This result, which is not
possible under the Inverse Model, suggests a novel method of
subsidizing innovation and skill-development, avoiding some of the
inefficiencies associated with more traditional methods.
The first step to understanding this result is to see that there are
circumstances where it would be socially desirable for a potential injurer
to invest in becoming skilled, but where even a tailored negligence
standard would provide insufficient incentive for the injurer to do so.
Under these circumstances, an injurer will choose to remain unskilled
under a tailored negligence standard, even where it would be socially
efficient for her to become skilled. That is, a tailored standard reduces,
but does not eliminate, the positive externalities associated with
developing additional skill, and thus reduces, but does not eliminate, the
problem of underinvestment in skill.
Under some circumstances, however, it is possible-to borrow the
language of Endres and Friehe-to trade static for dynamic efficiency,
producing lower overall social costs by holding skilled injurers to a
standard of care lower than the level that would be optimal for skilled
injurers in a purely static world. To find these circumstances, we must
determine when the following four conditions are met: (i) the total social
costs generated by a skilled injurer taking an "over-tailored" level of care
are less than the minimum social costs generated by an unskilled injurer;
(ii) this "over-tailored" level of care is less than the level that would be
individually optimal for skilled injurers in a purely static world; (iii) the
152. This is not to say that it would never be in the interests of a defendant to pretend
to be unskilled under a tailored standard. In the example given supra of a pedestrian
jumping in front of a car, feigning low skill could conceivably get the driver off the hook,
not on the grounds that she was not negligent, but rather on the grounds that the
negligence was not causative. See supra p. 323.
153. The results outlined below can be shown mathematically, though the degree of
tedium is more considerable than for the other results in this Article. See Korsmo, supra
note 103, at 30.
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injurer would choose not to become skilled if held to the standard that is
individually optimal in a purely static world; and (iv) the injurer would
choose to become skilled if held to the lower, "over-tailored" standard.
If these four conditions can be met simultaneously, it would be possible
to set an "over-tailored" standard for skilled injurers that, while sub-
optimal in a purely static world, leads to lower overall social costs in a
world where injurers can invest in skill.
To give a concrete driving example, assume again that the
precaution under consideration is moderating one's driving speed.
Assume further that the optimal cruising speed for unskilled drivers-the
uniform reasonable person standard-is 55 mph, and the optimal cruising
speed for skilled drivers is 65 mph. In this case, becoming "skilled" can
mean anything from developing better hand-eye coordination to gaining
better situational awareness by taking defensive driving classes to
developing computer and sensory technology to automatically avoid
accidents. Assume, however, that the benefit to a given driver from
being allowed to drive 65 mph is not enough to offset the cost of
becoming skilled, so that the driver would prefer to simply remain
unskilled and drive 55 mph like everyone else. The question posed is
whether, under certain circumstances, allowing the skilled driver to go
even faster than is optimal-say, 70 mph-can be sufficient to induce the
driver to become skilled, while still resulting in lower total social costs
than the alternative of the driver remaining unskilled and driving 55
mph?
Where the Standard Model applies, "over-tailoring" is never a
possibility, because the benefits of becoming skilled-lower precaution
costs-are already internalized by the injurer. Under the Inverse Model,
however, the benefits of becoming skilled-reduced accident costs-are
at least partially externalities from the injurer's viewpoint. That is, some
of the benefits of a person becoming a better driver are captured by
people other than the driver-pedestrians and other drivers who face less
risk than they would from an unskilled driver. As a result of this
externality, "over-tailoring" is a possibility. It is possible to achieve
reduced total social costs by lowering the applicable standard of care for
skilled injurers below the level that would be optimal in a static world-
in effect "over-tailoring" the standard of care-in order to induce injurers
to become skilled.
One might wonder what the purpose of this "over-tailoring" might
be, given the practical difficulty-likely formidable-of calculating an
appropriate "over-tailored" standard of care, and the apparent ease with
which the same positive effects could be achieved by simply providing a
direct subsidy for investment in skill. The answer is that over-tailoring
might be preferable where different injurers have different costs of
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becoming skilled, and it is difficult or impossible for courts or regulators
to determine these costs for any given injurer, at least in advance. 154 For
injurers with sufficiently high cost of becoming skilled, investment in
skill is not worthwhile-the costs of becoming skilled exceed the
benefits.' 5 If the cost of becoming skilled cannot be observed, however,
it is impossible to know who should be eligible to receive a subsidy and
who should not. In such a situation, subsidies would have to be made
available indiscriminately-with much attendant waste--or not at all.
A "subsidy" provided via over-tailoring could be held out to the
world at large with less risk of wasteful consequences. If the injurer can
prove that she is skilled, she can be provided with the lower, over-
tailored standard of care. If she cannot, she is held to the unskilled
standard. Such a "subsidy" costs society nothing unless it has already
achieved its desired effect of inducing the injurer to successfully develop
and demonstrate the requisite skill. With over-tailoring, it is the
individual injurer who bears the risk of making a bad investment in skill,
either because the investment costs her more than the liability she avoids,
or because it fails to result in the intended skill. As a result, injurers will
self-select. To the extent individual injurers are better than courts or
regulators at estimating their individual cost of becoming skilled, over-
tailoring will result in less wasteful investment than would an outright
subsidy.
Thus, where courts and regulators are able to estimate injurer skill,
but are unable to determine individual costs of becoming skilled, over-
tailoring may offer an attractive alternative to subsidies. 1
56
154. See Endres & Friehe, supra note 60, at 6 n.8 (noting that "it is usually the case
that innovations cannot be accurately predicted by an outsider such as a policy maker"
(citing Robert Cooter, Innovation, Information, and the Poverty of Nations, 33 FLA. ST.
U. L. REv. 373 (2005); Adam B. Jaffe et al., Environmental Policy and Technological
Change, 22 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECoN. 41 (2002))).
155. If the cost of becoming skilled is large enough, total social costs generated by
skilled injurers will always exceed those generated by unskilled injurers, no matter what
the applicable standard of care. Assuming that a given investment produces different
gains in skill in different individuals creates the same problem.
156. As noted supra, this result is not possible under the Standard Model. Under the
Standard Model, tailoring the standard of care means requiring more care of skilled
injurers, which, as Endres and Friehe show, provides disincentives to becoming skilled.
Where the Standard Model applies, reducing the standard of care for skilled injurers-
reverse-tailoring, in effect-is always either unnecessary to get injurers to choose to be
skilled, or results in greater social costs than the uniform reasonable person standard.
This result can be shown mathematically, but one way of understanding it intuitively
is to realize that, under the Standard Model, the benefits of becoming skilled-the
reduced costs of care-are already internalized by the injurer. It is only by tailoring the
negligence standard that externalities would be created, causing inefficient investment in
skill. Under the Inverse Model, the benefits of becoming skilled-the reduction in
accident costs-are initially externalities, and it is only by tailoring the negligence
standard that the injurer is allowed to internalize some of these benefits.
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VII. CONCLUSION
An economic model is only useful when applied to circumstances
where its underlying assumptions are valid. For a wide variety of
precautions, however, the standard simplification in the law and
economics literature regarding injurer capacity-that greater skill always
corresponds with a lower marginal cost of care, rather than a lower cost
of accidents at a given level of care-is misleading and often simply
wrong. While these assumptions may be applicable for many durable or
technological precautions, or where economies of scale are present, they
are far from universal. For many of the precautions courts commonly
consider in determining injurer negligence, there is little reason to
suspect that precaution costs vary systematically by skill level.
Precaution costs are particularly unlikely to be closely correlated to skill
level for nondurable precautions taken by individuals, where the major
costs involved are opportunity costs of time or attention.
The Standard Model being incomplete, the conclusions to be drawn
from it are likewise misleading. The Standard Model's assumptions lead
to the conclusion that particularly unskilled injurers should always be
permitted to exercise less care than particularly skilled injurers while still
avoiding liability. Because the term "standard of care" is ambiguous,
this conclusion has at least superficial plausibility in the context of the
well-known departures from a uniform reasonable person standard.
Individuals with discrete physical disabilities are ostensibly held to a
"lower" standard of care, while professionals acting in their professional
capacity are ostensibly held to a "higher" standard. This plausibility
evaporates, however, when reducing activity levels is recognized as a
form of precaution. A blind person is not simply required to drive
carefully, but is required to exercise the rather extraordinary precaution
of not driving at all. A doctor may commit malpractice by not
performing surgery to a professional level of skill, but a layperson will
be negligent-or worse-for performing surgery at all.
When applied to the types of precautions routinely considered by
courts, these standard descriptions of tort doctrine lose even surface
plausibility. They would suggest, for example, that under a given set of
circumstances, unskilled drivers should be allowed to drive faster, pay
less attention, and drink more than skilled drivers. It might be argued
that all the Standard Model really suggests is that skilled drivers should
be required to "drive better," but this is not the case. Even if it were
possible for a court faced with an accident to determine how "well" a
driver was driving, the assumptions used in the Standard Model lead to a
prescription of more precaution by skilled injurers, not simply fewer
accident costs. Other predictions rooted in the assumptions of the
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Standard Model-including the predictions that high-skill injurers will
conform to a uniform negligence standard while low-skill injurers will be
faced with a "pocket" of strict liability, and that a uniform standard will
protect incentives for innovation and skill development-are less
obviously dubious, but are similarly called into question by the limited
applicability of the underlying assumptions.
A different set of assumptions regarding injurer capacity-what I
have dubbed the Inverse Model-is equally consistent with the
underlying model of social costs of accidents, but offers a more plausible
interpretation for the contexts where the Standard Model fails. Instead of
assuming that more skilled injurers reduce social costs by having a lower
marginal cost of care, the Inverse Model assumes that skilled injurers
create lower accident costs at a given level of care. Under the Inverse
Model, a skilled driver driving 65 mph can be expected to cause fewer
accidents than an unskilled driver driving 65 mph, all else being equal.
This assumption leads to the prediction that low-skill injurers will have a
higher optimal level of care than high-skill injurers for some precautions,
and that particularly skilled injurers should be permitted to exercise less
care with regard to those precautions (and, what is the same thing,
exhibit a higher activity level) while still avoiding liability.
With these considerations in mind, we can now answer many of the
questions posed at the outset. What does it even mean to hold someone
to a "lower" or "higher" standard? If it is to serve as a meaningful
description of judicial practice, "lower" and "higher" standards should
refer to the amount of precaution required of the actor, not the degree of
safety to be achieved. A physically disabled individual may be required
to exercise greater precaution, and yet still create more risk of accidents
than an able-bodied individual. Similarly, the law might require a
professional to achieve a higher degree of safety or quality, while
simultaneously allowing her to take less of certain precautions.
Might the same individual be required to take more of some
precautions and less of others? Yes, absolutely. For some precautions-
perhaps durable precautions-an individual will have a lower-than-
average cost of taking additional care, while for other precautions-
perhaps non-durable precautions-the same individual will not have a
lower-than-average cost of taking additional care, but will cause fewer
accidents at a given level of care. As a result, the same individual should
be held to a higher standard for the first type of precaution, and a lower
standard for the second. In general, an individual should be required to
take more of a given precaution than average when that individual's
taking additional precaution generates a larger-than-average marginal
reduction in social costs. Conversely, an individual should be required to
take less of a given precaution when that individual's taking additional
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precaution generates a smaller-than-average marginal reduction in social
costs.
This prescription, unlike the one-way prescription generally offered
in the law and economics literature, comports with both common sense
and existing legal doctrine. Courts and regulatory law do not always
hold the physically disabled to a lower standard-they often require them
to take extraordinary precautions, often in the form of drastically reduced
activity levels. Likewise, high-skill individuals like professionals are not
always required to exercise greater precaution-they are often permitted
to exercise reduced care, often in the form of heightened levels of the
risky activity in question. Similarly, risk-regulating licensing regimes
often allow individuals who can demonstrate a certain level of skill to
undertake activities that would otherwise be considered negligent or
criminal.
In addition to correcting the main prescription of the Standard
Model, the Inverse Model suggests several other avenues of inquiry.
First and foremost, further work-some of it likely empirical-remains
to determine which precautions are best described by the Inverse Model
and which by the Standard Model. This Article suggests that one subtle
way of making such a determination is to examine whether the use of a
uniform reasonable person standard is creating a "pocket" of strict
liability for the unusually skilled or for the unusually unskilled. Where
the unusually skilled systematically choose to violate an applicable
uniform standard of care for a certain precaution, the Inverse Model is
likely to provide a good fit. A more comprehensive treatment would
allow courts to be more consistent and accurate in holding individuals to
higher or lower standards where appropriate.
Further work is also necessary to investigate possibilities for
tailoring the negligence standard and designing more efficient licensing
regimes. The analysis presented here suggests that tailoring the
negligence standard will often be beneficial. Where the Inverse Model
applies, tailoring the required standard of care would generate superior
incentives for technological innovation and development of skill, in
addition to superior incentives for the exercise of care. Where this is the
case, the analysis also suggests that information costs may not be as
formidable a barrier to negligence tailoring as is traditionally believed, as
unscrupulous parties seeking to avoid liability would be required to feign
high capacity rather than low capacity-a much more difficult
proposition.
The ideas developed here might also be usefully applied to legal
questions entirely outside the realm of tort law. To take just one
example, compliance with the duty of care in corporate law-at least in
Delaware-is largely evaluated in procedural terms, i.e., did the board
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employ a thorough procedure? Just as courts in torts cases are generally
restricted to evaluating the external manifestations of care, so too the
Delaware Court of Chancery generally restricts itself to evaluating the
procedural manifestations of care. 5 7 Perhaps the Inverse Model would
provide useful insights into the desirability and feasibility of different
standards for experienced and inexperienced boards. Similarly,
securities law often allows sophisticated parties-such as accredited
investors-to take risks that are forbidden to the less sophisticated.
Other examples abound, ranging from environmental regulation to
workplace safety, of topics that could be examined in light of the Inverse
Model.
Perhaps most unusually, additional inquiry may profitably identify
circumstances where "over-tailoring" the standard of care might generate
efficiency gains, serving as a superior form of subsidy for skill and
innovation. The Inverse Model suggests that this is most likely to occur
where the cost of measuring an injurer's skill level is low, but where
injurers are better able than regulators to estimate their cost of attaining
that level of skill. Tailoring standards of care-and especially "over-
tailoring" them-would involve greater administrative difficulties for
courts and regulators, but could potentially yield significant societal
benefits.
More generally, the analysis here highlights the difficulties that can
arise from over-abstraction in the law and economics literature. A failure
to consistently translate mathematical results into tangible doctrinal
prescriptions has led to decades of confusion over a topic that need not
be baffling. Even worse, it blinded economists from pursuing the
important consequences of the Inverse Model explored above.
157. See Stephen J. Lubben & Alana Darnell, Delaware's Duty of Care, 31 DEL. J.
CoRP. L. 589, 593 (2006) (noting that the notion that the duty of care is a purely
procedural matter "is often expressed in recent Delaware decisions").
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